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Innovation in International Organization:
The International Energy Agency
By BaicARD F. ScoTT
Legal Advtior, InternationalEnergy Agency; member of the California Bar.
This article expresses the personal vites of the author.

TIIE ESTABLISHMENT

of the International Energy Agency in

Paris on November 15, 1974, represented a major innovation in
contemporary international organization.' This organizational achievement of the major oil consumer countries was the keystone of their
constructive response to the unprecedented Arab oil embargo in the
Middle East crisis of 1973-1974 and the abrupt shift of control over
the oil market from the international oil companies to the producer
countries. Faced with an unexpected vulnerability to future oil embargoes and the adverse economic and financial implications of a dramatic
increase in oil prices, consumer countries could not merely acquiesce
in the new relationships. Nor could any of the consumer countries
hope to find adequate relief in a wholly unilateral response. For Europe

and Japan the dependence on imported oil was particularly acute;
even the United States and Canada were jolted into awareness that
their indigenous energy resources were not sufficient to meet their

most compelling needs in times of an oil supply emergency.
These considerations brought the oil consumer countries to a sharp

realization of their mutual interest in solving their energy problems
on a cooperative basis. They accordingly seized upon the institutional

alternative offered by the international system: the formation of an
1. The International Energy Agency has already attracted notice in the literature.
See Davignon, The New International Energy Agency of OECD, OECD Oasvwxn
JANuAnY - FEBRUARY, 1975, at 20; Lantzke, The OECD and its International Energy
Agency, 104 D4Ltnus 217 (Fall, 1975); Manin, Les R6actions des 2tats Victimes do
la Crise de V"!negie,in Socm-t FBNxcIS. PoUt R
Daorr lNTmNwAto.VAL, CoL.OQuE
DE CAEN, LA CRISE DE LtNtncEE Er LE Daorr INTEnNATioNAL at 137 (1976); Fischer,
L'Agence Internationale de 'ntgie, in ANNuAIE FAN-cAs na Dnorr INTEIATio.NAL
(1974) at 730; Woodliffe, A New Dimension to International Cooperation:The OECD
International Energy Agreement, 24 ThE INr'L AND CoMtP. L.Q. 525 (1975); Kaplan,
InternationalEconomic Organizations: Oil and Money, 17 HAnv. IrT"L L.J. 203 (1976);
Burcharc, The IEA in InternationalEnergy Politics,27 Aussm~r'oLrr= 192 (1976); Hopkins, Multilateral Government Arrangements for Management and Use of Energy Resources, 5 (i) Lve. Bus. LAw 67 (1977).
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international organization designed to provide, on the basis of joint
action, a mechanism for the achievement of their common objectives
in the energy field: That mechanism took concrete form in the International Energy Agency (IEA), created by the major oil consumer
countries as an autonomous agency of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD). The founders of the Agency
built upon existing institutional concepts and forms in this response
to the policy and organizational imperatives of the 1973-1974 crisis, 2
but in establishing the Agency, they also made a major contribution
to the form and structure of contemporary international organization,
as described in this article.
The establishment of the IEA reflected the founders' trust in new
organizational mechanisms for the peaceful solution of international
problems. If the Agency's structure and program prove worthy of that
trust, the Agency's successes may encourage future policymakers to
adopt peaceful means of solving their most difficult problems through
international institutions.
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL SITUATION IN 1973-1974
A. Producer Country Organization
The origin of the International Energy Agency may be found in
the changing structure of the world oil market at the time of the 19731974 crisis and, more immediately. in the resulting perceptions of both
oil producers and consumers about their future political and economic
relations. Prior to that crisis, the world oil market was dominated by
the major oil companies which had traditionally enjoyed the power
to determine prices paid to the oil producers. 3 During most of the
decade preceding the crisis, the excess of potential oil supply distributed among a considerable number of producers enabled the oil
companies to maintain downward pressure on the real prices they
would pay for crude oil.
2. The institutional alternative involved a reliance upon the forms of international
cooperation developed largely through 19th Century international administrative organizations (see generally L. WOOLF, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1916); C. JI;NKs, Tim
WORLD BEYOND THE CHARTER 47 (1969) and literature cited in JENKS), the League of
Nations, the United Nations and the other cooperative institutions created in the aftermath of World War II.
3. The historical background is found in ROUHANi, A HIsToLY OF O.P.E.C. (1971);
MIKDASm, THE CoMMUTrY OF OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES - A STUDY IN GOVENSseNTAL COOPERATION (1972); Mikdashi, Cooperation Among Oil Exporting Countries tvith
Special Reference to Arab Countries: A Political Economy Analysis, 28 INT. 011. 1
(1974); The Oil Crisis: in Perspective, 104 DAEDALUS (1975); A. KUIJAII, OPEC PAST
AND PRESET (1974); A. SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SISTmRS (1975).
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The producer countries, on the other hand, were particularly sensitive to the oil companies' action on prices. Since the revenue of those
countries depended upon oil income, any significant movement in
consumer prices for oil products could have had a dramatic effect on
their economies. The producer countries thus found themselves in the
late 1950's to be highly vulnerable. Although each producer needed
the maximum amount of oil revenue which could be generated, each
had to deal individually and under unfavorable conditions with sophisticated oil companies intent upon maximizing profits in their own
highly competitive markets.
Under these circumstances it is not altogether surprising that the
governments of the leading oil producing countries sought relief in a
cooperative effort designed to increase their bargaining power against
oil buyers. The oil companies' unilateral action in reducing prices in
1959 dramatized the producers' problems and stimulated them to seek
an organizational response. In place of individual government action,
which had previously suffered from ad hoc, incomplete, sporadic and
ineffective measures of cooperation, the producer governments sought
to solve their problems by utilizing the public international law institutions of diplomacy and international organization.
In the diplomatic phase the Government of Iraq convened the
Conference of the Exporting Countries at Baghdad from September
10 through 14, 1960, to seek a cooperative solution to the oil producer
problems. The Conference brought together in a traditional diplomatic
forum the representatives of the Governments of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, the countries which becamie the five
founding Members of OPEC.4 The principal action of the Conference
was the adoption of three resolutions which, when later approved by
the appropriate authorities of each Member, formed the "Agreement
Concerning the Creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries."5 That Agreement (1) recites the considerations which led
the Members to act, (2) describes the immediate cooperative action
to be taken, and (3) sets forth the rudiments of the international organization which came to be known as OPEC. Stating the Members'
4. In addition to the five founding Members of OPEC, the current membership of
OPEC consists of Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Quatar and the
United Arab Emirates.
5. The Agreement Concerning the Creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [hereinafter cited as the OPEC Agreement], open for signature September 14, 1960, 443 U.N.T.S. 248; 1 OPEC, RESOLUTiONS ADOPTED AT TtE CONFZRENCES OF THE ORGANIZATION

OF THE PETROLEUtMf EXPORTING COUNTRIES

cited as 1 OPEC REsOLUTIONS], Resolution 1.1.2. (1965).

[hereinafter
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action in the simple but -logical form of conference resolutions, the
Agreement still provides the basic legal framework of OPEC."

The statement of considerations which led to the adoption of the
OPEC Conference Resolutions shows clearly that at the outset the
OPEC Agreement was directed principally toward the protection of
the price of petroleum. The recitals- refer to the importance of petroleum export income to the financing of development programs and the
balancing of the Members' annual national budgets. They also state

that petroleum is a "wasting asset and to the extent that it is depleted
must be replaced by other assets." After acknowledging the world-wide
reliance on petroleum, as a primary source of energy generation, the
preamble concludes "[that any fluctuation in the price of petroleum
necessarily affects the implementation of the Members' programmes,
and results in a dislocation detrimental not only to their own economies,
but also to those of all consumer nations."
Th OPEC countries subsequently agree upon cooperative action
designed to maintain prices free from unnecessary fluctuation." They

undertake to endeavour, by all available means, to restore prices to
the levels prevailing before the 1959 reductions. Resolution 1.1.3 refers
to the regulation of production among other measures to be considered

as a means of stabilizing petroleum prices. In taking those actions the
OPEC countries would be prepared to act directly against the oil companies if sanctions were imposed on them." While the initial statement
6. At this time the OPEC countries were cooperating by diplomatic means. It had
become apparent by 1959, however, that a permanent cooperative structure would be
necessary for their future operations. Thus Mikdashi states that: "Conventional diplomatic methods would have led to serious delays in convening meetings and to the loss
of a sense of continuity and regularity in relations, and there would have been no secretariat entrusted with the function of the efficient spreading of information and the coordination of policies." Mikdashi, Cooperation Among Oil Exporting Countries with Special Reference to Arab Countrievs A Political Economy Analysis, 28 INT. Cie. 1, 18
(1974).
7. Recitals are contained in unnumbered, preambular paragraphs of the OPEC
Agreement.
8. Price action was provided in Resolution 1.1.2 as follows: "That Members shall
demand that Oil Companies maintain their prices steady and free from all unnecessary
fluctuations; that Members shall endeavour, by all means available to them, to restore
present prices to the levels prevailing before the reductions; that they shall ensure that
if any new circumstances arise which in the estimation of the Oil Companies necessitate
price modifications, the said Companies shall enter into consultation with the Member
or Members affected in order fully to explain the circumstances." OPEC AG1,EEhENT,
Resolution 1.1.2.
9. The defensive action contemplated against the oil companies was described as
follows: "That if as a result of the application of any unanimous decision of this Conference any sanctions are employed, directly or indirectly, by any interested Company
against one or more of the Member Countries, no other Member shall accept any offer
of a beneficial treatment, whether in the form of an increase in exports or an Improve-
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of OPEC commitments is thus essentially defensive in character, the
organization which was called into being at Baghdad was fully capable
of carrying out offensive as well as defensive measures when market
or political opportunities presented themselves.
The institutional arrangements in the initial Agreement are fragmentary. Resolution 1.2.1 states that:
With a view to giving effect to the provisions of Resolution No. I.
1 the Conference decides to form a permanent Organization called
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, for regular
consultation among its Members with a view to coordinating and
unifying the policies of the Members and determining among the
other matters the attitude which Members should adopt 'whenever
circumstances such as those referred to in Paragraph 2 of Resolution No. I. 1 have arisen11°
Membership in the Organization would consist of the five countries
represented in the Conference." Any other country with a substantial
net export of crude oil could become a Member if unanimously accepted by the original Members.'2 The principal aim of the Organization "shall be the unification of petroleum policies for the Member
Countries and the determination of the best means for safeguarding
the interests of Member Countries individually and collectively."' 3 The
Baghdad Conference Resolutions provide also that OPEC would meet
at least twice a year and that its work would be organized and administered by a Secretariat. Further work in developing the Organization
elements
was left to a subcommittee. Only the barest institutional
4
outlined above appear in the OPEC Agreement itself.'
The OPEC Conference later adopted in the Organization's "Statute"
the necessary additional institutional provisions." The Statute repeats
the preambular statements as well as the principles and aims of OPEC
as adopted in the Baghdad Resolutions. The Statute also creates an
OPEC institutional structure in the traditional form of public interment in prices, which may be made to it by any such Company or Companies with the
intention of discouraging the application of the unanimous decision reached by the
Conference." OPEC AREEMENT-r, Resolution 1.1.4.

10. The full text of Resolution 1.1.2 is set forth in note 8 supra.

11. See OPEC AREMENT, Resolution 1.2.2.
12. See Id. Resolution 1.2.3.
13. Id. Resolution 1.2.4.
14. See Id. Resolution 1.2.5 and 6.
15. The Baghdad Conference of September, 1960 is treated by OPEC as the first
Conference of the Organization. The reference here to the Conference is to the permanent Conference established by the Organization. The "Statute of the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)" [hereinafter referred to as the Statute]
was adopted by the Eighth OPEC Conference. held in Geneva from April 5-10, 1965.
Id. Resolution VIII.56 (1965).
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national organizations. Under Article 3 of the Statute the doctrine of
"sovereign equality" of Member Countries is firmly maintained, but
Members undertake in good faith to fulfill the obligations assumed
by them in accordance with the Statute.
In the OPEC Conference, designated as "the supreme authority of
the Organization," each Member Country is represented and has a
single vote.'" Decisions on matters other than procedural questions are
taken by unanimous agreement of all full Members of the Organization.' - Under amendments adopted in 1971, Conference Resolutions
became effective pursuant to a procedure of passive ratification.'" After
a meeting, members remain free to decline, by notification, to ratify
a resolution of the Conference; the resolution is effective thirty days
after the meeting only in the absence of such a notification.
Other provisions of the Statute deal with the establishment of the
organs of OPEC, the Secretariat, financial and similar provisions customarily found in the constitutive instruments of international organizations. 10 With the institutional arrangements in place, the OPEC
countries were poised to act collectively when favorable economic
conditions presented themselves.
In the industrialized countries, ever-increasing demand for oil in
the 1960's led to corresponding increases in oil imports and dependency
of the United States and Western Europe on OPEC oil. During the
decade of the 1960's, OPEC was not notably successful in influencing
oil prices, which remained relatively stable in absolute terms, but the
OPEC countries gradually built up a sense of community interest and
awareness of the need for cooperative action. They provided training
opportunities for government experts in OPEC, carried out joint research and economic preparations for a more favorable moment in
16. Statute, supra note 15, arts. 10 and 11C. The Conference is the policy making
organ of OPEC. Id., arts. 9 and 15.
17. Id. art. 11C.
18. Id. art. 110 as amended by the Twenty-fourth OPEC Conference held In Vienna
from July 12-13, 1971. 2 OPEC REsoL-rTios, Resolution XXIV.137 (1971).
19. The current OPEC organization has been described by Mikdashi as follows:
"By the mid-nineteen-seventies, the organization was composed of four groups: a secretariat, a conference of ministers, board of governors, and an economic commission. Tho
secretariat acts as the administrative arm of the organization, has a permanent headquarters, and operates on a regular basis. The three other groups respectively determino
policy, oversee the secretariat, and act as an economic advisory group (notably on prices).
The secretariat is run by professionals with a loyalty to the common objectives of the
organization; its chief officer, the secretary general, is appointed for a two-year term
by the conference on a rotating basis from each of the member countries. The other
three branches of the organization are composed of delegates from member countries,
who represent national interests and convene periodically to make decisions and recommendations." Mikdashi, The OPEC Process, 104 I)AEDAL s 203, 206 (Fall, 1975).
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which to act, and slowly built up pressure on consumers as market
conditions changed. The handwriting was on the wall for anyone to
20
read.
The combined effect of favorable market conditions and the existence of a cooperative organization in 1973-1974 permitted the OPEC
countries to remove from the oil companies the unilateral power to
set prices. After their new power was discovered, OPEC simply removed price as a subject of negotiation with the oil companies. OPEC

countries were thus enabled to set prices almost at will. In the space
of a few months the $2,59 per barrel price was raised to $11.65, effec-

tive January 1, 1974.21 The oil producers also discovered the political
utility of the "oil weapon." The oil embargo employed during the Yom
Kippur War by the Arab producer countries against the United States,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa, dramatized
for the producer countries their new potential for the exercise of
political power.

22

This swift and extraordinary increase in power of the oil producers
was made possible by the existence of OPEC, which became the most
dramatically successful international organization in history. Furthermore, the consumers could reasonably expect more difficulties to come.
As a permanent organization rapidly advancing to meet its aims, OPEC

stood ready to act in the future on behalf of producer countries at the
expense of the consumers.
B. Consumer Country Organization
If the -oil producers were enabled to act coherently in the 197320. The OPEC buildup is described at length in A. KuDhr, OPEC PAST AND
37 - 65 (1974); see Akins, The Oil Crisis: This Time The Wolf is Here, 51
AFn. us 462 (1973).
21. A convenient statistical table of posted prices of selected crude oils of certain
OPEC member countries for the period 1950 to January 1, 1974 is contained in A.
Kubbah, supra note 20 at 170.
22. In formal terms, OPEC does not have a mandate for the exercise of political
power. However, the economic strength made possible through cooperation in OPEC
has increased the potential of all producer countries for political power, not only with
the industrialized countries but also in relations with the other developing countries.
Mikdashi, supra note 19, at 206, observes that "[P]olitical matters are at least formally
outside the scope and purview of the organization." It should also be recalled that the
1973 - 1974 crisis embargo was not imposed by OPEC itself, but rather by the Arab
members of OPEC, who were separately organized in the Organization of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OAPEC), where the oil embargo and cutback decisions were developed. See Kubbah, supra note 20 at 98-101. While OPEC statesmen have been careful
to dissociate OPEC from the 1973-1974 crisis embargo, they have at times made provocative statements suggesting that in the future the embargo may be again employed
as an economic weapon. It cannot be altogether excluded that OPEC would have a role
to play in that event. Id.
PBFsF.NT
FOREIGN
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1974 crisis because of the institutional arrangements they had made
in OPEC, the consumer countries appeared at that time to be in organizational disarray, unable to act in a unified fashion. The policy differences which divided the consumer countries could not be overcome
through their existing form of international organization.
Although the principal consumers were grouped together in the
OECD, the Organisation was not equipped to deal with the types of
problems presented by the 1973-1974 crisis. Later, however, OECD
was to become the vehicle for the establishment of the International
Energy Agency, which would meet the consumer countries' energy
organization needs.
The OECD'" evolved in 1961 out of the Organisation for European
Economic Co-operation (OEEC), which had been established by
Western European countries initially to coordinate Marshall Plan aid
-4 Reconstituted as the OECD, '-'-,
to Europe following World War II.
the Organisation's membership expanded to include the United States
and Canada .2" During its early years, OECD lost its regional character

and became, for the developed industrialized countries, a functional
organization charged with the responsibilities indicated below.-"
At the time of the 1973-1974 crisis, OECD was the principal organization of the industrialized market economy countries of Europe, North
America and Asia. The responsibility of OECD extended to virtually
all economic questions which its Members wished the Organisation
to consider, including the principal concerns of' the development of
its Member countries' economies, the expansion of world trade, and
the progress of developing countries..2 11 Energy questions, of course,
23. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Paris, December 14, 1960 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891 [hereinafter cited as
OECD Convention]. The initial Members of OECD were Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the
United States.
24. Convention for European Economic Co-operation, Paris, April 16, 1948 92
U.N.T.S. 269; see Elkin, The Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, Its
Structure and Powers, 4 EUROPEAN YEAiuooK 96 (1958).
25. OECD Convention art. 15; Hahn, La Reconstitution de 'O.E.C.E. et sa Contnation dans I'O.C.D.E., in ANNUAInE FRANCAIS DE DolIT INTERNATIONAL 751 (1962).
26. Japan and Finland became Members of OECD in the 1960's. Australia and Now
Zealand joined the Organisation in the early 1970's, bringing the current OECD membership to 24 countries.
27. Kristensen, L'Organisation A Coopefration et de Detveloppement Pconomiques.
Ses origines, ses buts, sa structure, 9 EUROPEAN YEARBOOK 8&(1961); OECD, OECD HisTORy - Arms - STmucTuRE (1973); OECD, OECD - TASKS - TooLs - TnNDS
(1973); H. Aunay, ATLANTIC ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION (1967).
28. The aims of the Organisation are stated in Article 1 of the OECD Convention

supra note 23. They include promotion of policies designed to "achieve the highest sus-
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fell clearly within the Organisation's mandate. Although the OECD
was not at that time generally characterized explicitly as the international organization of consumer country governments, OECD was

indeed the forum in which those governments carried out economic
cooperation under the most auspicious organizational conditions then
available to them.

OECD's principal function was the exchange of pertinent information relevant to policy formulation in major economic fields. That
function was supported by institutional obligations Members had undertaken in the OECD Convention to "keep each other informed and
furnish the Organisation with the information necessary for the accom-

plishment of its tasks."-", Members also agreed in Article 3(b) to "consult together on a continuing basis, carry out studies and participate in
agreed projects." OECD was the forum in which economic policies

could be developed on the basis of shared information, and matters
of mutual concern to the Members could become the subject of recommendations or decisions of the Council, the supreme body of the
Organisation.

Unlike most contemporary international organizations, the OECD
Council was empowered to "take decisions which, except as otherwise
provided, shall be binding on all the Members."10 That decision-making
power was not limited to internal matters concerning the work of
OECD, but extended also to decisions on any matter falling within
tainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member
countries . .. to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as nonmember countries in the process of economic development . .. [and to] contribute to
the expansion of world trade ...." In Article 2, Members take obligations to promote
the efficient use of their economic resources, to promote the development of their resources in the scientific and technological field, to promote policies designed to achieve
economic growth and internal and external financial stability, to pursue their efforts to
reduce or abolish obstacles to the exchange of goods and services and to contribute to
the economic development of both Member and non-Member countries in the process
of economic development.
29. OECD Convention, supra note 23, art. 3(a).
30. OECD Convention, art. 5. That article also empowers the Organisation, in
order to achieve its aims, to make recommendations to Members and to enter into agreements with Members, non-member States and international organisations. The notion of
binding decision is developed in the OECD RuLus oF PnocEDURE oF TM OaGANSATIoN
(1976) [hereinafter cited as RuLEs OF ProcmrUE], which provides in Rule 18(a) that
the decisions of the Organisation taken in accordance with Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the
Convention, may be "(i) Decisions binding on the Members which the latter shall implement after they have complied with the requirements of their appropriate constitutional procedures." This may be contrasted with the reference to "recommendations" in
Rule 18(b) of the RuLus OF PROCEDURE, which provides that "Recommendations of the
Organisation, made in accordance with Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Convention, shall be
submitted to the Members for consideration in order that they may, if they consider It
opportune, provide for their implementation."

10

HASTINGS INT'L AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW

Inaug rad

the broad competence of the Organisation."' It is not surprising under these circumstances that unanimity is the rule of decision in the

OECD Council. Article 6.1 provides: "Unless the Organisation otherwise agrees unanimously for special cases, decisions shall be taken
and recommendations shall be made by mutual agreement of all the
Members." Since each Member is entitled to be represented and has
one vote in the OECD Council, 3 2 the unanimity rule requires in principle.the agreement of all twenty-four OECD Member countries. Although few exceptions to that rule had been made in OECD before
the establishment of the International Energy Agency, " unanimity in
OECD has never required the affirmative vote of each Member. Article
6.2 of the Convention recognizes the right of abstention and provides
that "such abstention shall not invalidate the decision or recommendation, which shall be applicable to the other Members but not to the
abstaining Member." 34 As will be seen below, that provision played a
key role in the establishment of the Agency in OECD.
The Organisation's work was carried out, then as now, by the
Council, the coordination and general assistance of an Executive Coin31. See RuL-s OF PRoCEDUnE, Rule 18(a)(it) and (II).
32. OECD Convention, art. 6(2). In the case of the International Energy Agency,
the concept of one vote for each country is formally maintained, but weighted voting
is achieved by provision for votes to have different weights. See below under Part VI
of this article for a discussion of the Agency's voting system.
33. Majority or qualified majority voting has been applied or authorized In a row
cases in OECD, e.g., for adoption of agendas, for proposals of the Invisibles Committee,
for submissions of the Governing Board of the Centre for Education Research and Innovation and (subject to appeal to the Council) for certain decisions of the Oil Committee. In no case had the OECD Council, prior to the establishment of the Agency,
delegated power to a subordinate body to act definitively on major matters by majority;
nor had the Council decided itself to act in any future cases by less than unanimous
decision. Although majority voting powers have been conferred upon the Council, If
the Council agrees by unanimity to act by majority vote, the) have not been exercised.
On the other hand, most of the work of the committees of the Organisatlon result In
reports which are transmitted to the Council without formal vote in the committees,
The committees are required to forward their reports, even though they may not reflect
unaninious agreement of the Members. (See RUL.s OF PaOCEDUnE, Rule 23). In such
cases, majority and minority views are expressed in the reports, which are transmitted
to the Council for consideration. In each case, the Organisation has acted by unanimity
or has declined to act.
34. Undei RULEs OF PROCEDURE, Rule 19, if a decision or part of a decision does not
apply to certain Members, the decision must, except as otherwise agreed, indicate the
Members to which it does not apply and the conditions in which it may become applicable to these Members if the occasion arises. Absence of a Member does not prevent
a decision from being taken (Rule 20). OECD Convention Article 6.3 provides that
"no decision shall be binding on any Member until it has complied with the requirements
of its own constitutional procedures. The other Members may agree that such a decision
shall apply provisionally to them." This provision has gone almost'nunnoticed; except
for one or two rare occasions, it has not been invoked, and accordingly the OECD
Council decision normally become immediately applicable to the Members which participate in them.
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mittee and the support of some twenty-five functional committees
established by the Council. Each of the committees was given a specific
mandate in the field of its main concern.
The principal OECD structure for dealing with energy questions
at the time of the 1973-1974 crisis was the Council, the Executive Committee and two functional bodies, the Oil Committee and the Energy
Committee, which had been given general power to carry forward the
Organisation's work in their respective fields.-' Neither of the Committees was given the power of decision or competence to act directly
upon Member countries' policies. The Committees' principal functions
were to prepare positions for submission to the Council, which retained
the sole power to act for the Organisation in the field of energy.
OECD had adopted, as respects oil, two legislative measures applicable only to the European Member countries of the Organisation.
These measures, held over from the OEEC, deal with stockpiling and
oil apportionment in an emergency. The OECD Oil Apportionment
Decision"l; adopts procedures to be carried out in the event of an
oil supply emergency in Europe and encourages European Member
countries to prepare advance plans for carrying out reductions in
consumption of petroleum products.
If an oil supply emergency should arise or appear imminent, the
Chairman of the Oil Committee would consult the Secretary-General
and convene the Oil Committee. The Committee would prepare apportionment recommendations for the Council, which could by unanimous decision, put into effect the emergency procedures provided in
the Decision.
Under the apportionment procedures, fuel (bunker) requirements
for ocean-going vessels and air transport would be met in full. Ninety
per cent of the remaining available supplies would be "automatically
allocated to Member countries in the same proportion as each Member
country's normal consumption of the product to that of all the European
Member countries." - 7 The other ten per cent of supplies would be
subject to special allocation to be decided by the Oil Committee in
consideration of serious economic difficulties due to lack of oil, climatic
35. The Annex to Ru_.Es OF PROCEDURE contains a list of the committees and indications concerning their respective terms of reference.
36. OECD, Decision of the Council on Emergency Plans and Al easures and Apportionnment of Oil Supplies in an Emergency in the O.E.C.D. European Area, adopted on

November 14, 1972 [C(72)201(Final)], with the abstention of Finland; an earlier
version was adopted by the OEEC Council on May 6, 1960 [C(60)83(Finnl)]. The
1972 decision is hereinafter referred to as the OECD Oil Apportionment Decision.
37. OECD Oil Apportionment Decision, Annex para. 3.
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difficulties and seasonal factors, and unexpected delays or losses of
supplies. In making the special allocations, the Oil Committee would
act by a two-thirds majority vote, subject to the right of a Member
country to request the Council to review the decision, in which case
unanimity would be required. 38
When the Council decides that oil supplies should be apportioned,
the International Industry Advisory Body (IIAB), consisting of fifteen
oil companies, including all of the major companies, would be activated
to advise the Oil Committee on matters relating to the availability of
oil from OECD Europe and to assist in the implementation of the
Oil Committee's recommendations for the apportionment of available
oil supplies. 39 The IIAB would assist the Oil Committee in assessing
the overall deficit in supplies as compared with estimated consumption
levels. Although the IIAB has remained on a standby basis since it
was first convened in 1967, it did not meet during the 1973-1974 crisis,
as will be seen below.
In addition to the Apportionment Decision, the OECD had in place
an oil stockpiling measure containing a recommendation to the governments of European Member countries "to achieve as soon as possible
a stock level of at least 90 days average inland consumption of the
previous calendar year."40 One of the important :Functions of the Oil
Committee was to review that recommendation and to report annually
to the Council on the progress achieved in its implementation.
The weaknesses in the foregoing system were manifest. Not only
were OECD procedures encumbered by the requirement of unanimity,
but the information system was also incompletely developed and
OECD was not equipped with the support services that would have
been necessary to mount a successful defensive operation in the event
of an emergency. The Oil Apportionment Decision was only a first step
in the direction of an effective defensive measure. It applied only to
the European countries and was limited to the apportionment of products. In these circumstances, there seemed to be little chance that
the OECD measures could play a significant role in an oil supply
emergency.
These insufficiencies inherent in OECD were of course known to
38. OECD Oil Apportionment Decision, Section Ill.
39. Id. Section IV.
40. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Oil Stockpiling, adopted on Juno
29, 1971 [C(71)113(Final)], with the abstention of Finland; an earlier version was
adopted by the OEEC Council on July 4, 1958 [C/M(58)21(Final), Item 1951. See
also for discussion of the EEC Council Directive on reserve stocks of petroleum, 1 CoMMiON MAnxTm
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the consumer countries, whih had begun consultations with OECD
in the summer of 1973 to associate the United States and Canada with
the European countries in a new oil apportionment scheme. A number
of meetings were held in an ad hoc group which was established by
the Oil Committee to deal with an expanded apportionment system.
There had also been informal discussions in the OECD Secretariat
about the need for a stronger institutional basis for dealing with a
wider range of energy problems. This developmental work in OECD
was overtaken by the crisis in 1973-1974, and was discontinued when
the International Energy Agency was established in November, 1974.
C. Institutional Management of the 1973-1974 Crisis
As the 1973-1974 crisis unfolded, the OPEC countries demonstrated
that their organizational cohesion was sufficient to enable them to reach
their political objectives. They were able to agree among themselves
upon the prices to be ipposed for their oil, and their production restraints adequately supported the price decisions. The combination of
economic power and the organization of their effort in OPEC permitted
the producer countries to achieve objectives which doubtless would
have seemed beyond their most extravagant dreams only a few months
before.
The consumer countries had an institutional mechanism in OECD
which could have served as a vehicle for a corresponding cooperative
effort had appropriate conditions for it existed. These included the
necessary political will and the judgment that the institutional arrangements in OECD were sufficient to make a suitable contribution. Neither
of these conditions seemed to be satisfied with respect to either the
Organisation's oil measures or the general institutional framework for
consumer cooperation.
At the time of the emergency, OECD country oil stocks were not
up to the recommended ninety-day level, but were held in a range of
seventy days' supply. The stock condition certainly reduced the vulnerability of the consumers, but the failure to reach the ninety-day
objective perhaps symbolized the incomplete state of their preparation
for an oil supply emergency.
OECD never invoked the European oil apportionment machinery
which might have distributed the risk more equitably among the
European countries and could have been extended on an ad hoc basis
to the United States, Canada and Japan. Since it appeared that the
requisite unanimous decision could not be achieved, there was no
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official proposal to invoke the European apportionment system. The
underlying reasons for this failure have been stated as follows:
The scheme could not be activated, however, in part because trust
in the flexibility of the oil market was'too strong to achieve the
unanimous agreement that was necessary. Other considerations,
such as a concern lest the oil exporters be offended, may have added
to the reluctance, but lack of information must be regarded as the
really decisive element.4"'

It was perhaps unreasonable to expect that a rule of unanimity could
operate effectively in the face of the divergent interests and policies
of so many countries concerned with such a vital matter.
The OECD emergency procedures thus did not provide 'a suitable
basis for the consumer countries to respond to the 1973-1974 crisis. The
actual role OECD could play under these circumstances was a limited
though useful one. The consumers were grouped in the Oil Committee
and its High-Level Group, composed of representatives of most of the
leading consumer countries. Each body was convened four times during
the crisis. Two reports on the supply situation were prepared by the
Oil Committee Chairman, after informal consultation with the oil
companies, for the Oil Committee and the High-Level Group. Since
the requisite unanimous approval was lacking, no attempt was made
to activate the International Industry Advisory Board, the normal
institutional channel for such consultation.
Information exchanges on such matters as stock levels and supply
and demand restraint measures were made in these OECD meetings as
well as in Heads of Delegation and other informal meetings convened
by the OECD Secretary-General. An effort to coordinate information
gathering through an OECD Secretariat questionnaire was attempted
without noticeable success. On the other hand, the OECD Council
was able to adopt recommendations 42 to its members on the supply
of bunker fuels for shipping and fishing and the supply of fuel for
civil aircraft. No other formal legislative action was taken by the OECD
Council during the crisis.
41. Lantzke, The OECD and its International Energy Agency, 104 DAuDALS 217,

220 (Fall, 1975).
42. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on the Supply of Bunker Fuels for Ship.
ping and Fishing, adopted on January 10, 1974 [C(73)257(Final)] and OECD, Recommendation of the Council on the Supply of Fuel for Civil Aircraft, adopted on January 10, 1974 [C(73)258(Final)]. These parallel instnments recommend that OECD
Governments (a) give priority to bunker requirements for shipping and fishing and for
aircraft fuel supply for international flights to the extent necessary to correspond to
traditional patterns, (b) refrain on a reciprocal basis from discrimination on the basis
of nationality of ships and aircraft, and (c) promote reduction of bunker fuel consumption and encourage air transport companies to achieve fuel economies.
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While the information activity, the informal consultations which
took place in connection with the meetings of OECD bodies, and other
actions taken during the crisis were useful as far as they went, the
available information was not sufficient to meet the needs of Member
countries and the institutional arrangements offered by OECD were
clearly not sufficient for mounting a multilateral crisis management
effort. This organizational inadequacy of the consumer countries greatly
increased their vulnerability to measures adopted by the better organized oil producers. Clear perceptions of the consumers' relative weakness led their policy-makers before the end of 1973 to reconsider the
need for developing additional institutional mechanisms for dealing
with their common energy problems.
H. STEPS TOWARD ESTABLISHING NEW CONSUMER
INSTITUTIONS
A. The Pilgrims Society Speech
The initiative in proposing the establishment of new institutions
was taken by Secretary of State Kissinger in the midst of the 1973-1974
crisis, when American thinking about the magnitude of the problem
and the need for international cooperation had evolved to the point
where new proposals could be made. In his address to the Pilgrims
Society in London on December 12, 1973, Secretary Kissinger stated
that the energy crisis of 1973 could become "the economic equivalent
of the Sputnik challenge of 1957." 48 Separating the transient from the
underlying causes of the energy crisis, he remarked that it was "not
simply a product of the Arab-Israeli War; it is the inevitable consequence of the explosive growth of world-wide demand outrunning the
incentives for supply." 4 The long-term solution to the economic aspect
of the energy crisis would be "a massive effort to provide producers an
incentive to increase their supply, to encourage consumers to use existing supplies more rationally and to develop alternate energy sources." 4r
43. Reproduced in USA DocUmENs, Public Affairs Off oe, United States Mission to
the European Communities, No. 61 (1973). The quoted statement is at 8 (also available under the title "Secretary Kissinger reviews US. - European Relations," address
by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to Pilgrims of Great Britain, London, England,
Dec. 12, 1973, S.I. 106: K64/3). The French newspaper Le Monde reported the Pilgrims Society speech under a headline "Un Nouveau 'Discours de Harvard,"; referring
to General Marshall's Harvard speech, in which the Marshall Plan was proposed. L
Monde, December 14, 1973 at 1, coL 3.
44. USA Docmxm;-s, supra note 43 at 7.
45. Id.
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For these purposes, and to coordinate an international program of
research to develop new energy technologies, Secretary Kissinger proposed that an "Energy Action Group" be established by the countries
of Europe, North America and Japan. 40 This proposal, which constituted the first official statement concerning new institutional arrangements, would group together high officials of those countries and
provide for participation of the European Economic Community and
the developing countries. The Pilgrims Society statement of Secretary
Kissinger outlined in those terms the organizational concept and major
objectives which were later translated into the instruments establishing
the International Energy Agency.41
B. The Washington Energy Conference
The United States moved rapidly to achieve the organizational
objective set out in the Pilgrims Society speech. On February, 11 and
12, 1974, the Washington Energy Conference brought together ministerial level representatives of the thirteen principal consumer countries,
officials of the EEC and the OECD.48 By that time the United States'
perceptions of the energy crisis reflected a political aspect of the crisis,
represented by the embargo, as well as the economic element, represented by the dramatic increase in oil prices.
In his welcoming speech, Secretary Kissinger emphasized first that
"the energy situation poses severe economic and political problems
for all nations. Isolated solutions are impossible." 40 He declared that
"this challenge can be met successfully only through concerted international action, " 0 and recognized that developing countries must be
brought into the consultation on the energy problems. A basic .consideration was that "Cooperation not confrontation must mark our
46. Id.
47. A few days after Secretary Kissinger's speech, there was a summit conforenco
of the European Communities at Copenhagen, at the close of which the Chairman declared that the Heads of State or Government considered that it was useful to examine
with other oil consumer countries, within the framework of OECD, the means of dealing
with short- and long-term common energy problems of the consumer countries. Sea
EuROPEAN CoMMuNrrEs, SEPIME RAPPORT GENERAL sun L'ACTIVITH' DES COMMNEN 1973 515, 519 (1974).
48. See WASHINGTON ENERGY CONFEnENCE February 19741, COMMUNIQuE, Doc, 17

AurEs EuRogEiNNEs

(Rnv. 1) February 13, 1974; 13 Ir'L L. MAT. 462 (1974).
49. WA SiNGToN ENERGY CoNFERENcE February 1974, Opening remarks of the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, February 11, 1974, Doc. 6 at 2. The
emphasis appears in the text.

50. id.
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relations with the producers." 5 1 Institutional assumptions were con-

tained in the United States' recognition of its "national responsibility
to contribute 5ignificantly to a collective solution" and its stated willingness to make specific proposals in the "follow-on" work of the
52
Conference to share American advances in energy teclmology.

The American policy statement on a program for meeting the
energy crisis contained, in addition to the points mentioned in the
Pilgrims Society speech, a proposal for the allocation of available supplies in time of emergencies and prolonged shortages. This proposal
reflects the judgment that "[W]e cannot leave our security or our
national economies to forces outside our control."' s Offering to make
available a portion of the total American petroleum supply in times
of emergency or prolonged shortage, the United States proposals referred to an oil-sharing formula, criteria to determine when a supply
shortage exists, a mechanism for carrying out the arrangement, and
stockpiling and standby rationing programs.
The Communiqu6 issued at the close of the Conference reflected
agreement of ministers on "the need for a comprehensive action program to deal with all facets of the world energy situation by cooperative measures. In so doing they will build on the work of OECD."5 4
The action program would cover the areas of conservation, demand restraint, emergency allocation of oil supplies, acceleration of development of alternative energy sources, and research and development
programs. This work would be carried out by "follow-on machinery,"
a coordinating group which was instructed to set to work to develop
a program based on the considerations outlined above.as
C. The Energy Coordinating Group

Shortly thereafter the Energy Coordinating Group (ECG) convened in Brussels to develop the program. All of the Washington Conference countries, with the exception of France, participated in the
ECG; they were later joined by Austria, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
and Turkey. Those seventeen countries met together in Brussels until
November, 1974, when their work culminated in the agreement on a
draft OECD Council Decision Establishing the International Energy
51. Id. The emphasis appears in the text.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 6.
54. CointuNiQuF, supra note 46 point 9; France did not accept point 9 in its
entirety.
55. Id. at point 16; France did not accept this point in its entirety.
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Agency5" and the text of the treaty entitled "Agreement on an International Energy Program,"5 7 the two instruments which together established the International Energy Agency as an autonomous body within
the OECD.
III. 1EA: AN AUTONOMOUS AGENCY OF OECD
A. Institutional Choices
When the outline of the International Energy Program, later
adopted in the Agreement, began to emerge in Brussels, the ECG
turned to a consideration of institutional arrangements for the execution of the Program. There were two principal institutional alternatives:
an independent agency which would be entirely free from any existing
organization, or an agency established within the OECD.
The OECD alternative presented a number of attractive advantages. OECD was already experienced in dealing with oil questions.
It enjoyed a highly developed and respected expertise in economic
analysis and statistics. OECD offered an existing organization with an
established staff, physical facilities, legal status and privileges and
immunities and was an on-going concern in which the new agency
could expect to function immediately. Moreover, the OECD was the
principal organization of the industrialized market economy Countries,
and would be expected to embody any new institutional arrangements
involving those countries. Since all of the ECG countries were Members of the OECD, a way might be found to integrate the Agency
into ihe existing structure of that Organisation without encountering
institutional difficulties.
There were other considerations to be weighed.'While all ECG
countries were OECD Members, the converse was not true. The OECD
countries which were not to become Members of the Agency might
find it politically difficult to have the Agency established within OECD.
Under OECD voting rules, described above, each of those countries
could prevent the Council from taking the decision establishing the
56. OECD, Decision of the Council Establishing an International Energy Agency
of the Organisation, adopted on November 15, 1974 with abstentions by Finland,
France and Greece, [hereinafter referred to as the Council Decision], [C(74)203(Final) ]; 14 IN'rL L. MAT. 789 (1975).
57. Agreement on an International Energy Program, signed in Paris on November
18, 1974; reproduced in OECD document C(74)203 and Corrigendum 1 and 14 INT
L. MAT. 1 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as the Agreement or the I.E.P. Agreement].
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Agency and might influence the decisions and operations of the Agency
once it were established. The latter consideration in particular presented an unacceptable risk to the efficient operation of the International Energy Program.
B. OECD Council Decision
These problems were resolved by the adoption of a number of
institutional arrangements in the Council Decision"8 which complements the text of the International Energy Program, as set forth in the
I.E.P. Agreement. 59 The Agency is formally established, under Article
1 of the Decision, as an "autonomous body within the framework of
the Organisation." That reference to the Agency as an "autonomous
body" was intended to emphasize the independence of the Agency
countries in acting on Agency questions within OECD. The Agency
is in no way autonomous vis-a'-vis the governments which participate
in it; nor does it have an expressly stated legal personality separate
from that enjoyed by OECD.60
C. Participation in the Agency
The Participating Countries of the Agency are identified in Article
2(a) of the Council Decision which enumerates the countries which
signed the I.E.P. Agreement three days later on November 18, 1974.
Provision is also made for new members which are limited to "other
Member countries of the Organisation which accede to this Decision
and to the Agreement in accordance with its terms." There have been,
to the date of this writing, two accessions to the Agreement: New
Zealand, which had not abstained from the Council Decision, and
58. See supra, note 56.

59. The I.E.P. Agreement is cited in the Preamble and various Articles of the Council
Decision but is not reproduced or incorporated by reference into the Decision.
60. Since the Agency was established within OECD, there was no need for the
Agency's constituent instruments to provide for a separate legal personality. OECD enjoys legal personality under Supplementary Protocol No. 2 to the Convention on the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, supra note 23. The Agency
would be deemed under general principles of international law to enjoy the legal personality necessary to carry out its functions and powers. (See 2 H. Sduamntms, lzremNATIONAL INsTn-TrIoNAL LAW 622 (1972)). Under Article 63 of the I.E.P. Agreement,
as Well as Article 12 of the Council Decision, the Agency is empowered to establish
appropriate relations with non-participating countries, international organizations, whether governmental or non-governmental, other entities and individuals. The Agency would
presumably enjoy the legal personality necessary to exercise those powers. The Agency
has already done so in the case of the Agreement with Norway, described below, which
was entered into by the Agency, acting in its own name, pursuant to a decision of the
Governing- Board.
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Greece, which had. Both of those countries have since completed the
appropriate procedures for becoming Participating Countries."'
The possibility of the European Communities becoming a party
to the Decision is provided in Article 3.2 Eight of the nine Community

countries participate in the Agency; only France does not. In the event
that the Community countries should decide to participate in the
Agency through the European Communities rather than as individual
Participating Countries, the terms of such participation would have
to be negotiated with the other Participating Countries in the Agency.
Article 3 of the Decision provides that this would be effected by the
accession of the Communities to the Decision and to the Agreement.
The I.E.P. Agreement provides in Article 72.1 that that instrument too
is open for accession by the European Communities.
While there is no express provision in the Decision or the Agreement for associate membership in the Agency, the Governing Board
of the Agency has, acting under general powers to establish relations
with countries which are not Participating Countries, arranged for a
special status for Norway. Despite its participation in the Washington
Energy Conference and the ECG, Norway was not able to accept all
the terms of the I.E.P. Agreement and consequently sought a special
relationship, which has been set forth in an agreement between Norway
and the Agency and in a Governing Board Decision.e
61. Both have acceded on a provisional basis to the I.E.P. 'Agreement, upon the
invitation of the Governing Board. Since New Zealand had not abstained from voting
on the Council Decision, it was a party to that Decision and thus became a Participating
Country of the Agency when the procedure for acceding to the I.E.P. Agreement had
been completed. In the case of Greece, which had abstained from voting on the Council
Decision, an additional procedure was necessary: Greece acceded to the Council Decision in addition to the I.E.P. Agreement.
62. Article 3 of the Council Decision provides, "This Decision will be open for accession by the European Communities upon their accession to the Agreement in accordance with its terms." The European Communities have not, to the date of this writing,
initiated proceedings under Article 3. The Communities do, however, fully participate
in the work of the Agency. This is done pursuant to an invitation of the Governing Board
based upon Supplementary Protocol No. 1 to the OECD Convention, supra note 23,
which provides for representation in the OECD of the European Communities In accordance with the institutional provisions of the treaties establishing those Communities.
The Supplementary Protocol also provides that the Commissions of the Communities
"shall take part in the work of that Organisation." The European Communities may
become Contracting Parties to the Implementing Agreements of the Agency in the field
of energy R & D. (For an example of these Agreements see 15 INT'L L. MAT. 48 (1916)).
The European Commission has already become a Contracting Party to two Agency 1I
& D Agreements in the field of nuclear energy.
63. Under the Agreement Between the Agency and Norway [IEA/GB(75)9], signed
in Paris on February 7, 1975, Norway agreed that it shall "[Iln case of emergency
involving serious shortage in oil supplies, contribute, by deci';ion of the Government, to
a sharing program by adding to normal supplies to Participating Countries of the Agency
such additional deliveries as may be obtained from appropriate demand restraint mcas-
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Participation in the Agency is dependent upon a country's being
a signatory to or being bound by the obligations of Participating Countries under the I.E.P. Agreement. Article 13(a) of the Council Decision
provides that "A Participating Country for which the Agreement shall

have ceased to be in force or to apply provisionally shall be deemed
to have withdrawn from the Agency." An exception to that rule is

provided for a government which notifies the Governing Board and
the depositary of the Agreement that the adoption of the I.E.P. by the

Governing Board is binding on it pursuant to the Council Decision. 4
In such a case a Participating Country need not be a party to the
Agreement as such, but may remain in the Agency if identical legal

obligations are undertaken in another form. That has been done by
the Governing Board in adopting by reference the full text of the
Agreement as a decision of the Governing Board.65 Under the powers
delegated to the Governing Board by the OECD Council, and the

Board's powers as provided in the Agreement, the Board is empowered
to make such decisions which are legally binding upon the Participating

Countries. Thus all members of the Agency in one way or another
are required to have accepted the obligations of the Agreement as a
condition of membership in the Agency.
D. The Program
The Program of the Agency, which the Governing Board is man-

dated to carry out under Article 6 of the Decision, corresponds to a
ures and from the activation of any stand-by production capacity that'may exist." (Article 1). There is also provision for Norway to have the obligations and enjoy the rights
of a Participating Country of the Agency under other substantive provisions of the International Energy Program (Chapters V - VIII inclusive). Under institutional arrangements adopted by the Governing Board, [lEA/GB/Dec. 75.2, March 7, 1975], Norway
is entitled on the same basis as a Participating Country to participate in plenary and
restricted organs of the Agency. The Decision also provides that the Governing Board
shall take all decisions requiring majority vote as if Norway were deemed to be included
in the list of Participating Countries, set forth in Article 62.2 of the Agreement (see
Table of lEA Voting Weights, set forth below at VI.C) with the three General Voting
weights and three Combined voting weights which would have been assigned to Norway
as a Participating Country. Norway is entitled to adhere to any other decision and is not
bound by any such decision to which it does not adhere. These arrangements result in
an association of Norway, without obligating it to carry out the emergency provisions
of the I.E.P. Agreement in the absence of its consent, but otherwise associating Norway
as closely as practicable with the work of the Agency.
64. Council Decision, art. 13(b).
65. IEA/GB/DEC.74/1 adopted on November 18, 1974 by the Governing Board.
That Decisic.n piovides that "The International Energy Program set out in the Agreement is hereby adopted and shall be carried out by the Agency and Participating Countries in accordance with its terms." One Participating Country has availed itself of the
procedure provided in art. 13(b) of the Council Decision,
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shorthand statement of the Program provisions set forth in detail in
the Agreement. They include the development ofa common level of
emergency self-sufficiency in oil supplies, common demand restraint

measures in an emergency, measures for the allocatioi of available oil
in time of emergency, development of an information system on the
international oil market and a framework for consultation with internati6nal oil companies, provision for a long-term cooperation program
to reduce dependence on imported oil, promotion of cooperative relations with oil producing countries and other oil consuming countries.
The Governing Board is also empowered to adopt "other measures of
co-operation in the energy field which it may deem necessary and
otherwise amend the Program by unanimity, taking into account the
the constitutional procedures of the Participating Countries.""
Upon the proposal of the Governing Board, the Council may confer
additiongl responsibilities upon the Agency.67 By that provision, the
OECD Council has limited its plenary power to amend the Decision
establishing the Agency, for additional responsibilities may be conferred on the Agency only upon the Governing Board's proposal. Since
each of the governments in the Governing Board of the Agency is also
represented in the Council of OECD and enjoys a veto power there,
the Agency countries are assured that no amendment of the Agency
Decision could be made without the unanimous agreement of the
Agency countries. This protective aspect of the rule of unanimity was
an important consideration for Agency countries in deciding to place
the Agency within the OECD framework.0 8
E. The Governing Board's Autonomy

The autonomy of the Agency is also assured by the provisions concerning the Governing Board. Article 4 provides, in terms parallel to
the OECD Council's powers, that the Governing Board
shall be the body from which all acts of the Agency derive, and
shall have the power to make recommendations and to take decisions which shall, except as otherwise provided, be binding upon
Participating Countries, and to delegate its powers to other organs
66. Council Decision, art. 6(a).
67. Id. art. 6(b).
68. This safeguard refers to any amendment to the Council Decision. The Agency
countries are thereby protected against any Council action which would diminish or
otherwise affect the powers of the Agency. Since each of the nineteen Agency countries
enjoys a veto right in the OECD Council, no amendment to the Council Decision may
be made without the consent of those nineteen countries.
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of the Agency. The Governing Board shall adopt its own rules of
procedure and voting rules.69
Article 4 thus contains a delegation from the Council to the Governing
Board to make binding decisions.
Within the energy field, the delegation of power is a complete one
in the sense that the Council has fully delegated on a non-exclusive
basis"0 all Council power in the energy field to the Agency Governing
Board, which in turn may further delegate to Agency organs.7 1 Since
the OECD Council had never previously made such a delegation of
power, it was uncertain for a time whether the non-Agency OECD
countries would authorize such a delegation to a body in which they
would not participate. It may now be established as OECD law that
such extensive delegations of power to a subordinate body are permissible under the OECD Convention. Since the OECD Rules of Procedure contain references to unanimous voting and other provisions
which would be inconsistent with the Agreement, there was provision
in Article 4 that the Governing Board could adopt its own rules of
procedure and voting rules, in order to ensure the autonomy of the
Agency.
An additional question of autonomy arose in connection with the
Agency's budget. Under OECD procedures, the Budget of the Organisation is adopted by the unanimous decision of the Council. Unanimity
is required even for prograxms limited to and financed by a group not
comprising all Member countries of the Organisation. Since the budget
power could be applied in a way inconsistent with the wishes of the
Agency countries, provision had to be made for the adoption of the
budget by means of a procedure which would effectively exclude the
vote of other countries. That was done by a provision that the Governing Board would "submit the annual and other budget proposals of
the Agency to the Council for adoption by agreement of those Participating Countries of the Agency which voted in the Governing Board
to submit the proposals to the Council."7 2 By that provision, the nonlEA Members in OECD surrender power over the Agency part of the
69. Emphasis added. The reference to "rules of procedure and voting rules" in Article 4 has special OECD significance. The OECD Rules of Procedure and voting rules
would otherwise be applicable. They require unanimity and provide for one vote for
each Member. The quoted provision of Article 4 relieves the Agency from the application of those rules.
70. For discussion of energy work in OECD but outside of the Agency, see infra
note 77.
71. Both art. 4 of the Council Decision and art 51.3 of the Agreement provide for
a delegation of power by the Governing Board to another organ of the Agency.
72. Council Decision, art. 10(b).
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OECD Budget. This makes possible the adoption of the Agency budget
within the OECD Budget and retains Agency country control over
Agency budget decisions. Thus, non-IEA Members of OECD agree
in effect to a form of perpetual abstention from voting in cases affecting
the Agency's budget. Because of the importance of Agency autonomy,
the adoption of some such provision in the Council Decision was an
indispensable condition for the agreement to establish the Agency
within OECD.73

F. The Secretariat
Whatever the formal arrangements might be, the autonomy of an
agency working within a larger body rests in the last analysis on the
individuals who do the work. A nice balance therefore had to be drawn
between Agency and OECD considerations with respect to personnel.
Under Article 7 of the Council Decision, the staff of the Agency and
the Executive Director are identified as forming part of the Secretariat
of the Organisation, which means that for adrhinistrative purposes they
are subordinate to internal OECD procedures and the instructions of
the Secretary-General. Article 7 also provides that the Executive Director and staff shall, "in performing their duties under the International Energy Program, be responsible to and report to the organs of the
Agency." The latter provision ensures that on Program questions within
the scope of the Agreement the Executive Director and staff owe a
74
primary duty of loyalty to the Agency.

The joint responsibility of the Governing Board and the SecretaryGeneral is also reflected in the provision for appointment of the Executive Director. Under Article 7(b), the Executive Director is appointed
"by the Governing Board on the proposal or with concurrence of the
Secretary-General." The final decision power is thus retained by the
73. The autonomy of the Governing Board is also reflected in the Council Decision
provisions on reports and cooperation. Article 8 of the Decision requires the Governing
Board to report annually to the Council on the activities of the Agency (the first annual
report is contained in OECD document C(76)17) and foresees other communications
to the Council. Article 9 provides for the Agency to "co-operate with other competent
bodies of the Organisation in areas of common interest."
74. In this respect, the I.E.P. Agreement provides without referring to the OECD,
that "In the performance of their duties under this Agreement the Executive Director
and the staff shall be responsible to and report to the organs of the Agency." (art. 59.3).
All decisions necessary for the establishment and the functioning of the Secretariat
are taken by the Governing Board, acting by majority. (art. 59.4). These provisions
are not fully operational. Authority over the staff is divided between the OECD Secretary-General, who acts under the OECD Council, and the IEA Governing Board, which
is responsible directly to the Agency Governments.
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Governing Board, composed solely of representatives of Agency Participating Countries, but the OECD-wide interest is acknowledged
by the limitation on the Board's appointment power to individuals
acceptable to the Secretary-General.
In practice these arrangements have worked out quite successfully,
not only because the importance of the relationships is well understood,
but also because the incumbent Executive Director of the Agency
serves as "Special Counsellor to the Secretary-General on Energy
Questions" in one of the highest OECD-wide posts. Moreover, all
the OECD staff concerned with energy matters have been incorporated into a "Combined Energy Staff," which serves as the Agency
staff under Article 7 and provides energy secretariat services to the
Organisation as a whole."n
The financing of the Combined Energy Staff is divided between the
Agency budget and the OECD-wide Budget. Under these budgetary
arrangements, the OECD agrees to finance part of the Combined
Energy Staff, but the Agency stands ready to ensure the availability
of staff by an undertaking to finance the entire part of the Energy Staff
which is not underwritten by the OECD-wide Budget. Thus if tlere
should be a problem presented by a non-LEA Member in financing the
Combined Energy Staff, the Agency countries are committed to the
financing necessary to ensure that the full staff complement will be
available to carry out the Agency's Program.
G. The Council Decision and the Agreement

The basic relationship between the Agency and OECD is thus set
out in the Council Decision. At the time of adoption of that Decision,
the I.E.P. Agreement had been fully negotiated but not yet signed.
The two-step procedure calling for adoption first of the OECD Council Decision and then the signature of the I.E.P. Agreement was a
practical measure reflecting the fact that the Agreement as negotiated
depends in part upon the Decision. Because of the OECD rule of
unanimity and the assumption that certain OECD Members would
not wish to participate, it could not be known with certainty in advance
of that Decision whether the Decision could be taken at all, and if so,
what its precise terms would be. As it turned out, the Decision was
75. The principal function of the Combined Energy Staff to OECD as a whole Is to
provide secretariat services to the Committee for Energy Policy, which replaced the
former Oil and Energy Committees discussed above. The Committee for Energy Policy
is a plenary committee of OECD which brings together the non-Agency as well as
Agency countries in the Organisation.
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adopted without substantial amendment in the form in which it bad
been negotiated among the Agency Participating Countries at the
ECG meetings in Brussels.
The I.E.P. Agreement deals principally with the substance of the
International Energy Program, discussed below, and the internal institutional arrangements for the Agency, together with the usual formal
provisions. There was no provision in the Agreement for the objective
legal personality of the Agency or its privileges and immunities or
other provisions which would have been necessary if the Agency were
established on an entirely independent legal basis. The assumption was
that such provisions would be unnecessary because the OECD framework would meet those requirements adequately.0 The Preamble of
the Agreement accordingly expresses the signatories intention that
the cooperative organs necessary to carry out the Program would be
created within the OECD framework and recognizes that other OECD
countries may wish to join in their efforts. Indeed, the Agreement provides in Article 71 that it is open for accession by OECD Member
countries willing and able to meet the requirements of the Program.
No difficulty was experienced in the final arrangements for the
establishment of the Agency within OECD. Both the OECD Council
Decision and the Agreement called for some adjustment of expectations by the Organisation and by the Agency countries. The practical
arrangements for the integration of the two institutions, carried out in
a spirit of goodwill, have made possible the development of a harmonious relationship which has proved to be advantageous both to the
Agency and the OECD country groups.77
76. See supra note 60.
77. Following the establishment of the Agency, there was some adjustment In the
organization of energy work in OECD. A clear need existed for arrangements to include
the non-Agency countries of OECD in new energy institutional arrangements within the
Organisation. The Oil and Energy Committees, with mandates described supra in the
text accompanying note 35, were inadequate for that purpose. Those two Committees
were merged into a new Committee for Energy Policy, a plenary committee of the
Organisation, on April 29, 1975. The mandate of that Committee, as amended on July
20, 1976 extends to the consideration of all energy resources. The principal functions
of the Committee are to promote cooperation of OECD Member countries in the fBld
of energy policy and for that purpose to undertake studies and exchange views. Reviews
of the longer-term prospects of the energy markets fall into the Committee's work.
(See, e.g., OECD, Wox= ENERGY OTLooK (1977).) International as well as national
aspects of the energy situation are also to be considered by the Committee. The Oil
Apportionment and Oil Stockpiling measures of the Organisation continue in force without modification for European Member countries of OECD. 'Te functions of the former
Oil Committee under those measures are now carried out by the Committee for Energy
Policy. The Committee is serviced by the Combined Energy Stuff. Many of the Agency
countries are represented in the Committee for Energy Policy by the same personnel
who sit in the Governing Board of the Agency.
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IV. THE AGREEMENT ON AN INTERNATIONAL
ENERGY PROGRAM
The establishment of the Agency within the framework of the
OECD involved, as noted above, not only the OECD Council Decision
but also the conclusion of an international agreement among the Participating Countries of the Agency. While the principal function of
the OECD Council Decision was to implant the Agency within OECD
and to make the institutional arrangements necessary for that purpose,
the agreement was designed to deal more specifically with the substantive elements of energy relations which in the aggregate are designated as the International Energy Program. Although the Program
could have been adopted with binding effect in the Council Decision,
the treaty form was thought to provide advantages in respect of
parliamentary commitment, formality and visibility as well as legal
standing.
A. Objectives
The objectives of the Program, as set forth in the Preamble to the
Agreement, resemble generally the objectives of the consumer countries
as developed in the Washington Energy Conference. The Preamble
thus reflects the Contracting Parties' desire "to promote secure oil supplies on reasonable and equitable terms," expresses their determination
to "take common effective measures to meet oil supply emergencies,"
refers to their desire "to promote co-operative relations with oil producing countries and with other oil consuming countries," expresses their
determination to "reduce their dependence on imported oil by undertaking long-term co-operative efforts on conservation of energy, on
accelerated development of alternative sources of energy, on research
and development in the energy field and on uranium enrichment." The
Preamble also reflects a consideration of "the special responsibility of
governments for energy supply" and states that the Contracting Parties
are "CONVINCED that these objectives can only be reached through
continued co-operative efforts within effective organs." The Program
contains an elaborate statement of binding rules concerning oil supply
emergencies and other areas of the Program which the Participating,
Countries undertake, in Article 1 of the I.E.P. Agreement, to implement
through the international Energy Agency. The Agreement also provides for the internal structure of the Agency and sets forth procedures
for developing and refining the rules embodied in the Agreement and
for the operation of the Program.
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Governing Board Decision

The International Energy Program, which is co-extensive with the
Agreement, was adopted by the Participating Countries in a decision
of the Governing Board as well as in the Agreement itself. At its First
Meeting, the Governing Board adopted a decision on the Program
which incorporated by reference the terms of the Agreement in its
entirety.7 8 That decision makes the Program binding on all Contracting
Parties under the terms of the OECD Convention. The internal bodies
of the Agency, as contemplated by the Agreement, were thereby
created. The effect of .this Governing Board Decision was to enact the
full Program within the Agency, for the purposes of internal organization, in parallel with the Agreement which, of course, remains valid
independently under the rules of international law.
C.

Contracting Parties

The initial Contracting Parties to the Agreement are those governments which are identified in the OECD Council Decision, adopted
three days earlier, as the Agency Participating Countries. One of the
effects of establishing the Agency within OECD was to create the expectation that only OECD Member countries could become members
of the Agency. This expectation is also reflected in Article 71.1 of the
Agreement, which states that the Agreement "shall be open for accession by any Member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development which is able and willing to meet the requirements
of the Program." Proposals for the admission of other countries could
raise legal difficulties. In formal terms, Article 71.1 of the Agreement
and Article 2(b) of the OECD Council Decision would have to be
amended. Practical means would have to be found for integrating' a
non-Member of the Organisation into the Agency which normally
depends upon that Organisation for its legal personality. However, no
non-Member of OECD has yet applied for admission to the Agency
or for a less formal association with it.
D.

Consents to be Bound

Under Article 67 of the Agreement, there is provision for each
Signatory State to notify the Government of Belgitim, the depositary,
that "having complied with its constitutional procedures, it consents
to be bound by this Agreement." The Signatory States thus adopted
the "consent to be bound" requirement, but agreed to give that consent
78. See supra note 65.
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by May 1, 1975, some six months after the Agreement was signed. It
subsequently became necessary for the Governing Board to exercise

the power accorded it under Article 67.4 to extend the time limit for

79
notification beyond that date.

The Agreement was not intended to enter into force until a minimum number of States had given their consents to be bound or had
deposited instruments of accession. Article 67.2 assures that, before

the Agreement enters into force, the minimum number of such States
must be sufficiently substantial for the Program to function properly.80

The requirements of Article 67.2 were satisfied on January 9, 1976,
when the consent to be bound of the United States was deposited, and
the Agreement entered into force on January 19, 1976, for States which
had deposited their consents to be bound before that date. For other
States the Agreement enters into force on the tenth day following the

day of deposit of their respective notification of consent to be bound.
E. Relation to National Law

It was, of course, understood from the outset that the constitutional
procedures would take a considerable period of time in some cases, but
that the Program must become operational immediately. In order to

avoid a possible delay of six months or longer, the Participating Coun-"
tries agreed in Article 68.1 on the provisional application of the Agreement as follows: "Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 67, this
Agreement shall be applied provisionally by all Signatory States, to the

extent possible not inconsistent with their legislation, as from November 18, 1974, following the first meeting of the Governing Board."8 1

The effect of the provisional application was to require Participating Countries to carry out the Program on a provisional basis to the
79. By April 1977, all Participating Countries with the exception of Greece, Italy
and Turkey had deposited their consents to be bound.
80. Art. 67.2 provides that "On the tenth day following the day on which at least
six States holding at least 60 per cent of the combined voting weights mentioned in
Article 62 have deposited a notification of consent to be bound or an instrument of accession, this Agreement shall enter into force for such States." For discussion of the
voting system and voting weights, see the Table of Voting Weights and discussion supra
in VI.C.
81. Provisional application is now specifically provided in Article 25 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed in Vienna and New York, May 23, 1969
to April 30, 1970 - T.I.A.S. -, - U.N.T.S. -, 8 IN'A L. MAT. 679. It has been employed in a number of organizations, including the Organisation for European Economic
Co-operation, Article 24(b) (the Convention is cited supra note 24); the GATr (see
J. JAcKsON, WORLD TRADE A" THE LA-w OF GArr 60 (1969)); and in the Convention
on the Establishment of the International Institute for the Management of Technology,
signed in Paris on October 6, 1971. Article 8(3), 8 Iri'r L. MAT. 679.
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extent that it was possible to do so under their existing legislation. As
it turned out, Participating Countries were fully able to meet their
obligations under the Agreement during the period of provisional application until the Agreement entered into force. No Participating
Country was required to excuse non-performance during that period
on the basis of the absence of legislative authority prior to the completion of its constitutional procedures. The provisional application rule,
codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, thus made
it possible for the Agency to advance its work during the initial period
of its life when the Participating Countries were, in parallel action,
obtaining the necessary legislative authorizations to carry out the
Agreement on a more permanent basis.112
The Agreement was not intended to be self-executing and therefore
required implementing legislation in those countries in which the
government had not been empowered to take the action required by
the Agreement. Under the international law of treaties, the Agreement
became fully binding, once it entered into force, For the States which
had given their consents to be bound. While a Participating Country
might, during the period of provisional application, be excused on the
basis of national legislation, from carrying out the terms of the Agreement, legislative defenses were no longer available to Participating
Countries once the Agreement had entered into force for them.Y' There
is no provision in the Agreement making any of the commitnients it
contains subject to national law. The commitments in the Agreement
thus require the Participating Countries to conform their national law
to the terms of the Agreement.
F. Duration
The duration of the Agreement is fixed in Article 69 as a period of
ten years from the date of its entry into force. The Agreement will
continue in force thereafter unless and until the Governing Board,
acting by majority, decides to terminate the Agreement. The minimum
period of the Agreement - and life of the Agency - is accordingly the
82. In the case of the United States, the legislative action was completed by adoption
of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, on December 22, 1975. P.L. 94-163, as
amended by P.L. 94-385, August 14; 1976; 2 ENERGY MANAGENirT (CCH) Para. 10,850
and Para. 10,878 (1976).
83. This result was quite clearly intended in the I.E.P. Agreement. It is also reflected
.in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 81, which provides in part that
"a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure
to perform a treaty."
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ten year period to January 19, 1986.4 An individual Participating
Country may, however, withdraw from the Agreement at an earlier
date.
Article 69.2 permits a termination notice to be given not less than
three years after the first date of provisional application of the Agreement, i.e. no earlier than November 18, 1977, which notice must be
given twelve months in advance. No Participating Country may terminate the application of the Agreement to it and thus withdraw from
the Agency before November 18, 1978. Under normal circumstances,
however, the Agreement will continue after 1986 until such time as
it is terminated by the Governing Board.
G. Amendments
There are two provisions in the Agreement for its amendment.
Article 73 provides for amendment at afiy time by the Governing
Board, acting by unanimity. Under that Article, the amendment will
come into force "in a manner determined by the Governing Board
acting by unanimity and making provision for Participating Countries
to comply with their respective constitutional procedures." This is a
normal provision for amendment of an international agreement in
which compliance with constitutional procedures is a condition to
its entry into force.
That requirement does not apply, however, in the cases of amendment of the voting provisions under Articles 62.5 and 62.6 of the Agreement, when membership changes occur or on annual reviews. In
deciding upon amendments to those voting provisions, the Governing
Board acts without the need for Participating Countries to obtain
additional constitutional authority. The consent to be bound by the
Agreement may thus be viewed as a consent to all future amendments
on the voting questions in accordance with Articles 62.5 and 62.6.
The voting rules have already been amended by the Governing Board
in that fashion to reflect the changes required for the admission of New
Zealand and Greece.
In the association arrangements with Norway, the voting rules were
not formally changed, but the Governing Board agreed in effect that
on decisions in which Norway participates, the Participating Countries
would vote in such a way a to give Norway the equivalent voting
84. It will be noted, however, that there is no express duration stated in the Council
Decision. The Agency will thus continue as an OECD body until the OECD Council
decides to terminate that Council Decision. A unanimous agreement of the OECD Council is necessary for that purpose.
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status of a full Participating Country in the Agency.85 Such an agreement as respects the application of existing voting power does not, of
course, constitute a formal amendment to the Agreement.
The Agreement established the key obligations of the Program, as
will be seen below, in a secure legal structure which is difficult but
not impossible to amend. The Agency countries thereby provided themselves with a firm basis for reliance on the performance of the other
countries in a critical area of economic life, in which they had become
increasingly interdependent. Although the conferring of amendment
powers upon the Governing Board might facilitate amendment of the
Agreement, the requirement of unanimity for any amendment of the
Agreement assures Participating Countries of the continuing integrity
of the Agreement and particularly of those elements, such as the oil
supply emergency provisions, which are of principal importance to

them.
V. PROGRAM COMMITMENTS IN THE I.E.P.
AGREEMENT
Reflecting the immediate concerns which led to the establishment
of the Agency, Chapters I to IV of the Agreement address emergency
oil supply problems. The Agreement adopts provisions for emergency

self-sufficiency in oil supplies, demand restraint commitments and rules
for allocation of oil in times of shortage, together with ,itrigger mechanism for bringing the emergency system into operation. Under those
Chapters, Participating Countries take legal commitments on the essential elements of the Program, and Agency organs are empowered to

undertake the necessary preparatory work to translate the Agreement
into a workable administrative system.
A.

Emergency Self-Sufficiency

The basic obligation of each Participating Country is to "establish
a common emergency self-sufficiency in oil supplies."o In order to
85. See supra note 63.
86. I.E.P. Agreement, art. 2. This emergency reserve commitment may be satisfied
by oil stocks, fuel switching capacity and stand-by oil production, under art. 3."Fuel
switching capacity is defined as normal oil consumption that may be replaced by other
fuels in an emergency, provided that this capacity is subject to government control In
-an emergency, can be brought into operation within one month and that secure supplies
of the alternative fuel are available for use." (I.E.P. Agreement, Annex, art. 2). "Standby oil production is defined as a Country's potential oil production in excess of normal
" which is subject to governmental control and
oil production within its jurisdiction ....
which can be brought into use during an emergency within the period of self-sufficiency.
(Id. arL 4).
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meet that objective each Participating Country agrees to "maintain
emergency reserves sufficient to sustain consumption for at least 60
days with no net oil imports."''S Provision is also made for a commitment to maintain ninety days of emergency reserves. However, the
effective date of the ninety-day level, left for future determination, has
been fixed by the Governing Board as January 1, 1980.18 The Participating Countries undertake to "endeavour" to achieve the ninety-day
emergency reserve level by that date. 9
In any case, the Participating Countries will be held responsible
for reaching the ninety-day level by January 1, 1980, -for purposes of
calculating their supply rights in an emergency.00 When their supply
rights are calculated, Participating Countries will be assumed to draw
down emergency reserves on the basis of ninety days of stocks, whether
or not those stocks are actually in place. In the interim, the Governing
Board has taken steps to move closer to the ultimate ninety-day target.
As of January 1, 1976, the Governing Board has decided that the stock
level should be raised from sixty to seventy days,91 and further step
increases may be contemplated until the ninety-day level is reached
in 1980.
The emergency reserve measures are designed to aid Participating
Countries to maintain economic activity during a future supply emergency. With the advantage of a buffer period based on coordinated
stock levels, Participating Countries should be enabled to rely upon
their own energy resources, notwithstanding an embargo or other future shortfall in oil supply. Since the independence of a Participating
Country may depend upon the stock position of other consumer countries as well as the existence of sufficient reserves in its own country,
the performance of each country in maintaining reserves is essential
to the security of the group as a whole.
Consequently, the obligation to maintain emergency reserve stocks
is stated in mandatory terms in the Agreement and Governing Board
decisions and Agency administrative machinery is provided. The Standing Group on Emergency Questions (SEQ), a plenary committee of
the Agency, is empowered under Article 4 to review on a continuing
basis the effectiveness of the measures taken by each Participating
Country to meet its emergency reserve commitment. The SEQ re87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

I.E.P. Agreement, art. 2.1.
This was decided by the Governing Board on November 8-9, 1976.
I.E.P. Agreement, art. 2.2.
See discussion of supply rights below.
Decided at the Governing Board meeting of September 17-18, 1975.
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ports on this subject to the Governing Board which is empowered
to adopt recommendations to Participating Countries concerning their
compliance with the emergency reserve commitment.
B. Demand Restraint

Another security element foreseen in the Agreement is the need
for measures to be taken in preparation for the restraint of demand
for oil supplies during an emergency. Various means for restraining
demand could be foreseen, but the situations are so variable and the
number of possible elements so great that no specific demand restraint
measures are adopted in the Agreement. Each Participating Country
does, however, in recognition of the need for preparedness, undertake
legal obligations to restrain demand. Those obligations refer not to specific. measures as such, but rather to the achievement of the objective
expressed in terms of a specified percentage reduction of consumption.
Article 13 provides that in the event of a 7 per cent reduction in
group supply, the obligation of each Participating Country is to implement measures sufficient to produce a 7 per cent reduction in consumption. Under Article 14, if supply is reduced at least 12 per cent, each
Participating Country's measures must reduce consumption by 10 per
cent.
The objective of the demand restraint provisions is not to impose
specific demand restraint measures, but rather to prepare the ground
for adoption of such measures as may be required to reduce oil demand
in the circumstances of a specific shortfall in oil supply. The Participating Countries thus agree that they would at all times have ready a
2
program of contingent oil demand restraint measures.0
When the emergency measures are activated, the demand restraint
provisions become mandatory. Since a commitment of this nature
should not be left to the mere statement of an abstract obligation, the
Agreement charges the SEQ to review and assess, on a continuing
basis, each country's demand restraint program and the effectiveness
of the measures actually taken by them. The SEQ's reports on demand
restraint are reviewed by the Governing Board, which may make
recommendations to Participating Countries on this subject.9 ,
92. I.E.P. Agreement, art. 5.1 provides "Each Participating Country shall at all times
have ready a program of contingent oil demand restraint measures.enabling it to rcduco
its rate of final consumption in accordance with Chapter IV." The reductions In rates of
final consumption, defined in art, 7.8 as "total domestic consumption of all finished
petroleum products" are contained in articles 8, 13 and 14. Under art. 16, a Participating
Country is entitled to substitute for demand restraint measures the use of stocks hold In
excess of its emergency reserve commitment, provided in the Agreement.
93. I.E.P. Agreement, arts. 5.2 and 5.3.
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C. Allocation

The third element of the program for sharing oil among all Participating Countries in an emergency is an arrangement for allocation
of the available oil. Under the system set forth in the Agreement, each
Participating Country is entitled to a "supply right" representing its
fair -and equitable share of the oil supplies available to the Agency
countries as a group. "4 The "supply right" is equal to a country's permissible consumption, calculated as indicated below, less its emergency
reserve drawdown obligation. The amount to be deducted as a result
of that obligation is the countrys share of the "group supply shortfall"
(i.e. the difference between group permissible consumption and oil
supplies available to the group). This share is calculated as the proportion of the country's emergency reserve commitment (i.e., tle oil
stock and other reserves commitment as defined in the Agreement)
in the total emergency reserve commitment of all Participating Countries.s 5 The permissible consumption for purposes of that calculation,
a rate based upon an objective historical standard,90 is determined in
accordance with data regularly supplied to the Agency. The calculation
of permissible consumption also takes into account a reduction corresponding to the amount that is required to be saved under the applicable level of demand restraint. The calculation made in application
of the foregoing concepts thus leads to the establishment of the oil
"supply right," which reflects the demand restraint obligation and takes
into account the distribution of the supply shortfall loss among all
Agency countries.97
The allocation of available oil is made on the basis of calculations
94. In art. 7.7 the term "oil supplies available to the group" is defined as: all crude
oil available to the group; all petroleum products imported from outside the group; and
all finished products and refinery feedstocks which are produced in association with
natural gas and crude oil and are available to the group.
95. See I.E.P. Agreement, art. 7.
96. This is accomplished by a reference to "final consumption" during a "base period" defined in art. 18 as "the most recent four quarters with a delay of one-quarter
necessary to collect information."
97. Art. 9.3 of the I.E.P. Agreement provides for the maintenance, insofar as possible,
of normal channels of supply, as well as normal supply proportions between crude oil
and products and among different categories of crude oil and products. Under art. 9.4,
one of the objectives of the Program is to maintain historical supply patterns within the
industry. Art. 10.1 provides for "fair treatment for all Participating Countries and basing
the price for allocated oil on the price conditions prevailing for comparable commercial
transactions." Price questions are to be examined by the SEQ, under art. 10.2. Art. 11.1
provides that "It is not an objective of the Program to seek to increase, in an emergency,
the share of world oil supply that the group had under normal market conditions. Historical oil trade patterns should be preserved as far as is reasonable, and due account
should be taken of the position of individual non-participating countries."
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made pursuant to the foregoing principles. If a Participating Country's
supply right exceeds its domestic oil production and the net available
imports during an emergency, the Participating Country enjoys an
"allocation right" for additional net imports of oil equal to the amount
of that excess. 8 The additional imports are to be supplied from the
domestic production or imports of other Participating Countries which
are found to have an "allocation obligation" pursuant to the application
of similar principles. An "allocation obligation" arises for a Participating
Country in which the sum of its normal domestic production and actual
net imports of oil exceeds its "supply right," calculated as indicated
above. 9

In the case of a reduction of oil supply of a single Participating
Country, that country would have an "allocation right" and the other
Agency countries together would have a corresponding "allocation obligation." Under Article 17.1 allocation of oil to the Participating Country takes place when the reduction exceeds 7 per cent of its normal
consumption. The country concerned is required, in accordance with
Article 8.1, to absorb the first 7 per cent of its reduction in oil supplies;
its supply right is limited to the excess of the shortfall over the amount
required to be absorbed. The obligation to allocate is shared among the
other Participating Countries on the basis of their final consumption
during the base period. 100 They may meet their allocation obligations
by means of their choice, including demand restraint measures or the
use of stocks. In this way, the single Participating Country which suffers a supply shortfall'is supported by the entire group's sharing of the
available oil with the adversely affected Participating Country.
Each Participating Country's actual supply of indigenous and imported oil thus falls under international allocation rules in time of an
emergency or shortage. Each Participating Country has in effect surrendered its right to determine unilaterally the oil which would be
made available for its own use. The oil available to a Participating
Country would be determined by application of the allocation principles noted above, and not by its own perceptions of need or the
political or economic judgments of the oil producer countries outside
of the Agency. In that way, the IEA countries have organized them98. I.E.P. Agreement, art. 7.2.
99. Id. art. 7.3. Under art. 9.1 the following elements are -to be included for purposes
of satisfying allocation rights and allocation obligations: all crude oil; all petroleum
products; all reflnery feedstocks; and all finished products produced in association with
natural gas and crude oil.
100. Id. art. 8.2; see also supra note 97.
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selves into a cohesive grdup in which indigenous oil and imported oil
will be shared on a rational basis.
The heart of the emergency system lies in the sharing obligations
summarized above. They are stated not as recommendations or requests
to Participating Countries, but rather as firm legal obligations. In addition to the commitments taken in the Agreement, Participating Countries have adopted in the Governing Board a number of refinements
in the system, which the Board is empowered to adopt by majority vote
under special provisions contained in the Annex to the Agreement and
in the emergency Chapters. Moreover, the Governing Board has been
granted general powers to decide upon practical procedures for the
allocation of oil and the participation of oil companies in the emergency
01
system.
Participating Countries have accepted the basic commitment in
Article 6.1 of the Agreement to take all the necessary measures in
order that allocation of oil will be carried out pursuant to the relevant
Chapters of the Agreement. Administration of the commitment is provided by Article 6.2 which requires the SEQ to review and assess on
a continuing basis each Participating Country's measures and the effectiveness of measures actually taken. The work of the SEQ is in
turn reviewed by the Governing Board, which has adopted detailed
procedures for the application -f the emergency system.
D. Activation
While the sharing system established by the Agreement is not a
fully self-executing one, it contains a procedural safeguard to ensure
that in appropriate cases the system will be implemented without political interference. The emergency sharing obligations are subject to
certain activating events set forth in Chapter IV of the Agreement.
Referring to the provisions of that Chapter, Article 12 provides that:
Whenever the group as a whole or any Participating Country sustains or can reasonably be expected to sustain a reduction in its
oil supplies, the emergency measures, which are the mandatory
demand restraint referred to in Chapter II and the allocation of
101. I.E.P. Agreement, art. 6.4. The leading oil companies cooperate with the Agency
through the Industry Advisory Board (LAB), established by the Governing Board on
February 6, 1975. The lAB, composed of ten to fifteen companies, provides the IEA
with advice and consultation on emergency oil sharing and related questions. The lAB
is responsible for the practical execution of the allocation program under the Agency's
direction. The LAB has assisted in the development of Agency structures and procedures
for dealing with an emergency, and will be available to cooperate with the Agency in
the event of an emergency.
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available oil referred to in Chapter III, shall be activated in accordance with this Chapter.102

The events which trigger the emergency system and bring its legal
obligations into play are the following:
1. Whenever the group sustains or can reasonably be expected to

sustain a 7 percent reduction in the daily rate of its oil supplies; 05
2. Whenever the group sustains or can reasonably be expected to
sustain a 12 percent reduction in its daily rate of oil supplies; 104
3. Whenever any particular ParticipatingCountry sustains or can
reasonably be expected to sustain a supply reduction exceeding 7
percent of its normal consumption. 05

Each of the triggering events noted above involves necessarily a
finding of fact as to the specified reduction in the daily rate of oil

supplies. If that finding were left for decision by each Participating
Country or even by the group as a whole, political elements could
clearly influence the determination, precisely at a time when the system should be free of political elements if it is to function effectively
in the uniform interest of all Participating Countries. The framers of
the Agreement therefore sought a means to minimize non-technical
considerations in the activation of the system.

Insulation from political considerations is achieved by the delegation of power to the Secretariat of the Agency, 00 a body of international civil servants required to be impartial and non-political in
carrying out their functions.10 7 The Secretariat makes the requisite
finding on the basis of its information and judgment without the intervention of a political body. Once that finding is made, it is protected
by a review procedure designed to safeguard it against undue political

intervention.
102. I.E.P. Agreement, art. 12.
103. Id. art. 13.
104. Id. art. 14.
105. Id. art. 17.
106. I.E.P. Agreement, art. 19.1 provides that "The Secretariat shall make a finding
when a reduction of oil supplies as mentioned in Article 13, 14 or 17 has occurred or
can reasonably be expected to occur and shall establish the amount of the reduction or
expected reduction for each Participating Country and for the group."
107. The rules concerning impartiality of the staff are found in the OECD Convention, supra note 23, and the Staff Regulations. The Combined Energy Staff Is subject
to the OECD Convention, art. 11.2 which provides that "Having regard to the International character of the Organisation, the Secretary-General, the Deputy or Assistant
Secretaries-General and the staff shall neither seek nor receive instructions from any of
the Members or from any Government or authority external to the Organisatlon." In
addition, Staff Regulation 2(a) provides that "The duties of officials of the Organisation
are international in character. Officials shall be subject to the authority of the SecretaryGeneral, and shall be responsible to him alone for the discharge of their duties and
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By satisfying the condition precedent to the obligation to implement the emergency measures, the Secretariats finding leads inexorably within twenty-four days to the obligation to implement. That
obligation will arise unless the Governing Board, acting by a defined
special majority, decides to block the emergency measures, to activate
them in part only, or to fix another implementation time limit.10 8 In the
absence of such action, the implementation obligation arises within
twenty-four days of the Secretariats finding. During that twenty-four
day period, the procedural steps within the Agency would unfold as
set forth below. Assuming Day 1 as the date of the Secretariats finding,
the indicated procedures would be carried out no later than the days
shown:
Day 1 - Secretariat makes a finding of the reduction in oil supplies
under Article 19.1.
Day 2 - The Management Committee meets to review the accuracy
or 3of the data compiled and the information provided.
Day 4or 5

The Management Committee reports to the Governing
Board, setting out the views of the Committee members,
including any views regarding the handling of the emergency.

Day 6 - The Governing Board meets to review the Secretariats finding, in the light of the Management Committee's report.
or 7
Day 8 - Emergency measures' activation is confirmed, unless the
Governing Board decides otherwise.
or 9
Day 23- Participating Countries are legally obligated to implement
or 24 the emergency measures.
Accordingly, within twenty-four days after the Secretariats finding,
the obligation to implement measures arises, in the absence of a blocking decision by the Governing Board. Under the applicable "special mathe observance of the Regulations of the Organisation." OECD, STAFF MANUAL 15
(1975). Such provisions are commonly adopted in the constituent documents of international organizations. In this respect; the OECD followed the lead of the United Nations; the U.N. CaARTmn, art. 100 contains comparable language. The staff in both the
United Nations system and OECD are protected by a staff rule system designed to
enhance their independence from the governments and other external authority. See
D. H
WiLmsjoLD, THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE IN LAw AND FAcT, (also fou)d
rKsqoLD, SERVAN OF PEACE: A SEu.ex,
oN OF His SPcEmms
in W. FOOTE,DAG HAwmo
AND STATEMNTS 329 (1962)) and other materials on the international civil service in
JonDAN, INTERNAnTONAL AmmasnuATox 245 (1971).
108. I.E.P. Agreement, art. 19.1, 19.2 and 19.3. The special majority and other voting
rules are described in VI.C supra.
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jority" voting rule, a blocking decision requires the support of approximately 75 percent of the Agency countries holding at least 60 percent
of the voting power in the Governing Board. 0 9 In practical terms that

means neither the U.S. nor the EEC countries as a group could block

the trigger. Such blocking action could be prevented, on the other
hand, by the EEC acting alone, or by the U.S. with the support of one
to four other Participating Countries, depending on their respective
voting power. Such blocking action could be prevented by any five
Participating Countries. It will thus be concluded that since blocking
action is very difficult to achieve, the system was constructed to ensure
that in the absence of.significant opposition, the Secretariat's finding
would be given operative effect under the Agreement.
The twenty-four-day trigger mechanism described above, is however, the "worst case" in terms of the timing of the obligation to implement emergency measures. The procedure outlined in the Agreement could be shortened substantially, for each of the steps described
above refers to the maximum permissible period, subject to a reduction
in time if desired.
A shortened procedure is specifically envisaged for cases where the
initiative is taken by a Participating Country to request the Secretariat
to make a finding. In that case, the twenty-four-day schedule is in effect
reduced to ten days, but the mechanism loses its automaticity., 0 The
earliest day that the implementation obligation could arise on the
twenty-four-day schedule is Day 16. Theoretically, implementation
could arise on Day 1 if all the Participating Countries agreed by
unanimity.
Article 22 provides that "[t]he Governing Board may at any time
decide by unanimity to activate any appropriate emergency measures
not provided for in this Agreement, if the situation so requires." Under
that provision, the Governing Board is enabled by unanimity to shorten
the procedure at will. In the normal case, when the Secretariat's finding reaches the Governing Board for decision, the fifteen-day delay in
109. I.E.P. Agreement, art 62A(a). For discussion of the Agency voting system and
the Table of IEA Voting Weights, see supra VI.C. The "special majority" required under
art. 19.3 to block the trigger is defined in art. 62.4(a) as 60. percent of the "total
combined voting weights and 42 general voting weights," described more fully In VI.C
supra.
110. On the 24 Day schedule, the implementation obligation arises automatically unless the Governing Board intervenes. In the case of the 10 Day schedule under art. 21,
action is taken not automatically but by decision of the Governing Board, acting by
majority. If the Board finds that the conditions set out in art. 13, 14, 15 or 17 are fulfilled, emergency measures shall be activated accordingly.
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the implementation obligation can be reduced or expanded by the
Governing Board, acting by "special majority.""'
The Agreement also provides similar procediires for deactivating
the emergency measures. "'' The Secretariat first makes a finding that
the condition for activation no longer exists. That finding is then reported to the Management Committee, which meets within seventytwo hours to consider the question. The Management Committee must
report to the Governing Board within the next forty-eight hours. The
Governing Board is required in turn to meet within forty-eight hours
after it receives the Management Committee's report. Deactivation
takes place automatically unless within a final forty-eight-hour period
after the Board meets it decides to maintain the emergency measures
or to deactivate them only in part. If the Secretariat has not made a
deactivation finding, the Governing Board may at any time decide by
"special majority" to deactivate the measures either wholly or in part. 11
The Agreement does not deal expressly with the problem of sanctions for obligations of the Participating Countries. The principal
sanction of those obligations is found in the inherent value of the
system to Agency countries. So long as the I.E.P. Agreement provides a viable system of protection, the Participating Countries will
find it in their interest to meet their obligations and to ensure the
success of the system. The ultimate sanction is thus the possible bearing of the costs of a break-down of the system. That would almost
certainly mean an increase in vulnerability to external situations, including political developments beyond the control of consumer countries. Participating Countries thus have a clear interest in ensuring that
their obligations are fully carried out.
In the case of operations under the Agreement, a Participating
Country which fails to meet its obligations may be denied the benefits
of certain rights under the Agreement. Provision is expressly made for
this sanction with respect to demand restraint and the emergency
reserve obligations, for the "supply right" in an emergency will be
calculated upon the assumption that those obligations are met, irrespective of whether in fact they are or not, and there are doubtless
other situations where sanctions of that nature could be imposed by
the Governing Board. The monitoring function of Agency organs may
also be expected to reveal implementation problems for which remedial
111. I.E.P. Agreement, art. 19.3.
112. The deactivation provisions are contained in I.E.P. Agreement, arts. 23 ana 24.
113. Id. art. 24.
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action might become necessary. A formalization of sanctions was not
contemplated in the Energy Co-ordinating Group discussions on the
draft Agreement text. Any need to impose formal sanctions against a
Participating Country would simply mean that the system would have
broken down with a resulting loss of benefits to the group as a whole.
This is another way or recognizing the proposition that the effective
sanction of the I.E.P. Agreement is the inherent value of the system
itself and the continuing interest of Participating Countries to ensure
that the I.E.P. Agreement is respected.
E. The IEA Information System
The general operations of the IEA, as well as the work in the
emergency sector, are supported by legal commitments on the establishment and operation of information systems. A "general" information
system on the operation of the international oil market and activities
of the oil companies is established under Article 255.1 of the Agreement.
Separate provision is also made for a "special" information section
devoted to the efficient operation of the emergency program. The information system is-operated on a permanent basis under the responsibility of the Secretariat in accordance with arrangements agreed upon
by the Participating Countries.
The Participating Countries are required, under the general section
of the information system, to provide the Secretariat with precise data
relating to oil companies operating within their respective jurisdictions.114 Where the data is necessary to the efficient operation of tlis
information system, the obligation extends to corporate structure, financial structure (including accounting statements and taxation information), capital investments, terms of access to major sources of
crude oil, current rates of production and anticipated changes, allocation of crude oil or affiliates to other customers, stocks, cost 6f crude
oil and oil products, prices (including transfer prices to affiliates) and
such other subjects as may be included by unanimous decision of the
Governing Board.115
114. Id. art. 27.1 and 27.2.
115. Id. art. 27.3 provides that "Each Participating Country shall provide information
on a non-proprietary basis and on a company and/or country basis as appropriate, and
in such a manner and degree as will not prejudice competition or conflict with the legal
requirements of any Participating Country relating to competition." A system of controls
has been devised by the United States to ensure protection against violation of United
States antitrust rules (see Energy Policy and Conservation Act, supra note 82. § 252)
and arrangements have been made with the EEC Commission for the same purpose.
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A Standing Group on the Oil Market (SOM) is established to review the operation of the general section of the information system
and to report to the Governing Board.11 In preparing its reports, the
SOM is required to consult with oil companies to ensure that the information system is compatible with industry operations. The information systeri has been systematically implemented within the Agency
which has, in accordance with the Agreement, made the resulting oil
market and company data available to Agency countries.
Participating Countries are also obligated, under the "special" section of the information. system, to make available to the Secretariat all
information which is necessary for the efficient operation of the emergency system.117 They undertake that all oil companies operating within their jurisdiction will make such information available. On the basis
of this information and other sources of information, the Secretariat
is required to survey continuously the supply and consumption of oil
within each Participating Country and the group as a whole. These
functions of the information system are reviewed by the Standing
Group on Emergency Questions (SEQ), 118 which is empowered to
consult with the oil companies to ensure that the emergency information system is compatible with oil industry operations. The information
and other functions of the Agency are supported by a system of consultations with the oil companies to be carried out on a regular basis
within the Agency.11 9
F. Long-Term Co-operation Programme
From the outset, one of the key functions of the Agency was to
contribute to the long-term solution of the energy problem. The I.E.P.
Agreement provides only a framework for that purpose.120 Article 41
contains a declaration that Participating Countries are determined to
reduce their dependence on imported oil over the longer term, and
they agreed to that end to "undertake national programs and promote
116. I.E.P. Agreement, art. 31.
117. Id. art. 32.
118. Id. art. 36.
119. Concerning co-operation with the oil companies on the epergency program, tea
supra note 101. A general framework for consultation with oil companies under the
auspices of the SOM, is established in Chapter VI of the I.E.P. Agreement. Art. 37
provides for "a permanent framework for consultation within which one or more Participating Countries may, in an appropriate manner, consult with and request information from individual oil companies on all important aspects of the oil industry . .. :*
120. Provision for long-term cooperation on energy is contained in Chapter VII of
the I.E.P. Agreement.
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the adoption of co-operative programs, including, as appropriate, the
sharing of means and efforts, while concerting national policies," in the
areas of energy conservation, development of alternative sources of
energy, energy research and development and uranium enrichment. A
Standing Group on Long Term Co-operation (SLT) was established
to develop the Agency's work in that field.
The framework provisions of the I.E.P. Agreement were later given
greater substance by the Governing Board. On January 30, 1976, the
Governing Board adopted the "Long-Term Co-operation Programme"
(L.T.C.P.) to give effect to the general commitment stated in the
Agreement. 12 1 The L.T.C.P. is a comprehensive program, adopted by
unanimity in legally obligatory terms, designed to achieve long-term
energy objectives. Under the L.T.C.P., the Participating Countries are
obligated to establish energy conservation objectives for the group,
taking into account the national objectives and forecasts of individual
Participating Countries. 22 They agree to hold within the Agency periodic reviews of their national programs and policies relating to conservation.' 23 They also undertake "to stimulate and increase production
from alternative sources of energy as rapidly as possible

. .

., [and] to

create a climate favourable for investment in energy, employ public
resources and contribute to, or directly engage in, the production of
alternative sources of energy." 24 The L.T.C.P. provides for the establishment of medium and long-term alternative energy.source objectives
for the group as a whole and periodic reviews of country activities in
that sector.
As respects cooperative energy projects, Participating Countries
undertake to "establish an overall framework for co-operation under
which specific measures of assistance will be provided. 25 The intention
is the stimulation of energy investment and the "facilitation of concrete
projects bringing together complementary factors of production from
two or more Participating Countries." The Agency Secretariat is required to establish a clearing house for relevant information on energy
policies and programs of the Participating Countries and opportunities
for possible cooperative projects in IEA countries. The Agency will
121. 15 -i'WLL. MAT. 249 (1976).
122. L.T.C.P., Ch. II.
123. Conservation programs of Participating Countries were reviewed in 1976 (see
OECD, Energy Conservation In the InternationalEnergy Agency, 1976i R vmv (1976)),
where the results of that review and an indicative list of recommended -energy conservation measures are described.
124. L.T.C.P., Ch. III.
125. L.T.C.P., Ch. III, sec. C.
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thus provide a cooperative center for future activity of Participating
Countries in their efforts to develop alternative energy sources. In order
to encourage the formation of cooperative projects, the L.T.C.P. adopts
Guiding Principles concerning the identification of projects, the sharing of contributions to projects and measures for the facilitation of
120
investment.
As a general support measure, the L.T.C.P. also provides a Minimum Safeguard Price for imported oil, sometimes loosely referred to as
the "floor price," designed to protect investment in alternative sources
against the possibility of destructive oil price reductions.' ' - This measure was adopted by the Governing Board in mandatory terms as
follows:
In order to encourage and safeguard new investment in the bulk
of conventional alternative sources of energy, the Participating
Countries shall, as a general measure of co-operation ensure that
imported oil is not sold in their domestic markets below a price
28
corresponding to U.S.$7/bbl.
The Minimum Safeguard Price rule is to be implemented in accordance with detailed review and administration provisions of the
129Programme.
The L.T.C.P. also contains commitments by Participating Countries
to carry out energy research and development programs, including
jointly financed R & D cooperative projects.' 30 For that purpose they
adopted a group of Guiding Principles on Research and Development,
and Intellectual Property Guidelines, which are annexed to the
L.T.C.P.13 l
In order to advance further the objectives of the Lbng-Term Programme, the Participating Countries recognize "the desirability . . .
of not affording less favourable treatment to nationals from other
Participating Countries than that afforded to nationals of their own
countries in the energy field ... [and agreed to] work towards the
identification and removal of legislative and administrative measures
126. Id. at para. 5.
127. L.T.C.P., Ch. III, sec. D.
128. Id. para. 1.
129. Id.; see also Annex I to the L.T.C.P.
130. L.T.C.P., Ch. IV. By April 1977, Agency Governments (or parties designated by
them) and the EEC in some cases had entered into fourteen Implementing Agreements
on energy R & D in the fields of coal, nuclear safety, thermal nuclear fusion, energy
conservation and solar heating and cooling system technology, and additional Agreements
in those and other fields were in preparation for signature in the course of 1977.
For an example of these Agreements see 15 Ibr'L L. MAT. 48 (1976).
131. L.T.C.P., Annex II.
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which impair the achievement of the overall objectives of the Programme."13 2 They agreed moreover to:
use their best endeavours to apply legislation and administrative
regulations, within the limits of their already existing laws and
regulations, in such a way as not to afford to nationals of other
Participating Countries less favourable treatment than that afforded
to nationals of their own countries, in particular with regard to
energy investments, the purchase and sale of energy, and the enforcement of rules of competition.1 33

The L.T.C.P. thus deals comprehensively with approaches to the
long-term energy problems, while in the I.E.P. Agreement itself only
fragmentary consideration of those problems was feasible. The Agreement necessarily gives priority to the establishment of the emergency
system and the structural elements of the Agency. Had sufficient time
remained in the Brussels Energy Co-ordinating Group, more specific
long-term energy program commitments could have been written into
the Agreement. That, however, was left for binding Governing Board
action, which was realized in the L.T.C.P. Decision of January 30,
1976. The Governing Board continues to develop program and institutional measures in the long-term field which may ultimately prove to
be the area of the Agency's greatest contribution to the resolution of
energy problems.
G. Relations with Producer Countries
One of the key objectives of the International Energy Program, as
indicated in the Preamble to the Agreement, is the promotion of cooperative relations with oil producer countries. This broad political
objective did not, of course, lend itself to precision in the statement of
'legal obligation in the Agreement. At the time the Agreement was
signed it was premature to undertake legal or comprehensive institutional arrangements. Article 44 of the Agreement does provide that
"[t]he Participating Countries will endeavour to promote co-operative
relations with oil producing countries and with other oil consuming
countries." They undertook to "keep under review developments in
the energy field with a view to identifying opportunities for and promoting a purposeful dialogue, as well as other forms of co-operation,
with producer countries and other consumer coubntries."
The spirit of good will in these provisions continues to guide the
work of the Agency. Institutional arrangements may be expected to
132. L.T.C.P., Ch. V; that Chapter is not binding on Canada.
133. Id. par. 2.
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develop in areas where the producer and consumer countries have
converging interests. The Agency thus participates as an active observer in the Ehergy Commission of the Conference on International
Economic Co-operation, assists in the preparatory work for that Conference and will doubtless be involved in any continuing arrangements
in-the energy field when the Conference ends. Meanwhile, the Agency
acts as an informal forum for the exchange of views by Agency countries in preparation for the discussions on energy questions in the Conference, and provides information and techmical support service to
the Conference. The development of relations between oil consumer
and oil producer countries may eventually reach the point where more
substantial institutional or legal arrangements among them could be
made either through the Agency or outside it.

VI. INTERNAL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
The internal structure of the Agency was designed to provide the
institutional means of carrying out the initial International Energy
Program on a continuous basis. That structure consists of the essential
organs of the Agency: the Governing Board, the Management Committee and the four functional Standing Groups. The institutional arrangements also settle the most pertinent questions of the competence and
procedure of those organs.
A. The Governing Board
The principal organ of the Agency is, of course, the Governing
Board, which is identified in Article 4 of the OECD Council Decision
as "the body from which all acts of the agency derive .... " That Article
also provides that the Governing Board "shall have the power to make
recommendations and to take decisions which shall, except as otherwise
provided, be binding upon Participating Countries."'13 4 A general grant
of powers to the Governing Board is also contained in Article 51.2 of
the Agreement as follows:
The Governing Board shall review periodically and take appropriate action concerning developments in the international energy
situation, including problems relating to the oil supplies of any
Participating Country or Countries, and the economic and monetary implications of these developments.
134. For discussion of the Governing Board in relation to the problem of the autonomy
of the Agency within OECD, see supra II1.E.
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The specific mandates of the Governing Board in each of the Agency's
fields of operation, stated in particular detail in the Agreement, also
constitute in the aggregate a third general grant of powers to the Board.
The Governing Board is composed of "one or more ministers or
their delegates from each Participating Country.""', Although the
Board normally meets at "high official' level, a Ministerial Meeting of
the Governing Board was held in the spring of 1.976 and more ministerial level meetings as required by the Agency's work are to be envisaged.13 6 The Board is empowered to adopt, by majority vote, its
rules of procedure, and also elects its Chairman and Vice-Chairmen. 87
Article 52 of the Agreement contains the key provision by which
the "decisions adopted pursuant to this. Agreement by the Governing
Board or by any other organ by delegation from the Board shall be
binding on the ParticipatingCountries."'38 This element of the Governing Board's power was also, as noted above, provided in the OECD
Council Decision, Article 4. The grant of power to the Governing Board
to make such binding decisions, which have themselves the force of
an international agreement under international law, is particularly
significant in view of the voting provisions which determine the means
by which the binding decisions may be adopted. In the cases where
unanimity is not required - and those cases are the rule rather than
the exception in the Agreement - the Participating Countries have
in effect given up to the Governing Board the power to decide, on the
basis of qualified majorities, questions within the competence of the
Governing Board. In view of the economic importance of the matters
which lie within the Board's competence, the significance of this grant
of power to the Governing Board should not be underestimated.
A Governing Board decision is legally binding upon all Participating Countries, even a country which did not support the decision."1,
While the Governing Board is empowered under Article 61.2 to pro135. I.E.P. Agreement, art. 50.1.
136. See OECD- Press Release, PRESS/A(75)20, May 27, 1975.
137. I.E.P. Agreement, arts. 50.2 and 50.3. The Governing Board in its formativo
years employed flexible procedures without adopting formal rules of procedure.
138. Emphasis added.
139. This is of course true of decisions taken by majority and special majority, as
provided in the Agreement. There is no provision excluding the application of a majority
decision to the dissenting minority. See statement of the author in Socdrg F1ANCAIS%
poun DE Dnorr INTERNATIONAL, COLLOQUE DE CAEN, supra note 1 at 209, 210. The
decision may, of course, provide for limited application in terms of countries or conditions.
See art. 61.2.
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vide that a decision shall not be binding on one more Participating
Countries or that it shall be binding only in certain conditions, the
Board has not made particular use of those provisions." 40 In almost
all cases, the. decisions of the Governing Board have been binding upon
all Contracting Parties, and each of the countries admitted to membership by the Governing Board has accepted all of the previous decisions
of the Governing Board without exception or condition.
B. Other Agency Bodies
In addition to the Governing Board, provision is made for the
Management Committee, an intermediate body designed to prepare
matters for submission to the Governing Board for final disposition. 141
The Management Committee was thus conceived as a preparatory
body consisting of high-level officials, able to translate the technical
work of the Standing Groups into suitable form for action by the Governing Board. In practice, however, it has not been necessary to convene the Management Committee in the first two years of the Agency's
work. The Agreement requirements for -reports of the Standing Groups
to be reviewed by the Management Committee and for that Committee
to report to the Board have been satisfied by a procedural decision of
the Governing Board to convene each of its meetings as joint meetings
of the Board and the Management Committee. Thus it has not been
necessary for the Management Committee to organize itself or to be
convened in separate meetings for carrying out its functions under the
Agreement.
The four Standing Groups, like the Board and the Management
Committee, are plenary bodies of the Agency.' 42 Their finction is to
carry out the first level examination of questions within their competence and to report thereon to the Management Committee or the
Governing Board. The Agreement contains rather detailed statements
of the competence of each of the Standing Groups in their respective
fields: Emergency Questions (SEQ), Oil Market (SOM), Long-Term
Co-operation (SLT) and Relations with Producer Countries (SPC).
Although the Governing Board is empowered to "delegate any of its
functions to any other organ of the Agency,"' 43 to date the Governing
140. An example where a decision was not, in part, binding on a Participating Country, is the L.T.C.P., of which Chapter V is not binding on Canada. See vupra note 131.
141. I.E.P. Agreement, art. 53.
142. See I.E.P. Agreement arts. 54 to 58, inclusive.
143. LE.P. Agreement, art. 51.3.
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Board has not made significant delegations of power to any of the
Standing Groups, although the Board has given extensive instructions to the Standing Groups for carrying out preparatory work to be
submitted to the Governing Board for decision.
The Governing Board has itself established subordinate bodies such
as the Committee for Energy Research and Development, under the
Board's power to "establish any other organ necessary for the implementation of the Program,"' 44 and the Standing Groups as well as the
R & D Committee have themselves established working parties and
other subordinate groups in order to help them carry out their work.
C. Voting in Agency Bodies

The Agreement provides for one of the most complex voting arrangements existing in any international organization.14 , In adopting

those voting arrangements, the Participating Countries departed from
the principle of "one country one vote," which was derived from the
traditional doctrine of "sovereign equality of states" and which is applied in OECD and most other international organizations. The "one
country one vote" principle could not be applied in the Agency because
it could not reflect the different magnitudes of the interests of Participating Countries in the decisions to be taken in the.Agency. Nor could
it reflect the relative ability of Agency countries to shape the action
that might have been taken if the Agency had not been established.
Nevertheless the "one country one vote" principle was not completely abandoned in the Agreement. It was retained in all cases requiring unanimity of the Participating Countries for the Governing
Board to act.'14 Unanimity is required under the Agreement for a

number of fundamental decisions such as the amendment of the
Agreement, 147 any change in the agreed scale of contributions to the
Agency,148 changes in the number and distribution of voting weights
144. Id. art. 49.2.
145. The voting systems employed in international organizations generally and th
use of weighted voting are described in 2 H. SCHEmmEtS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL
LAw 327, 331 (1972).
146. I.E.P. Agree'ment, art. 62.1 provides that "Unanimity shall require allof tho votes
of the Participating Countries present and voting. Countries abstaining shall bo considered as not voting."
147. I.E.P. Agreement, art. 73.
148. Id. art. 64.1.
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on account of changes in oil consumption,' 49 changes in voting weights
and voting requirements for majority and special majority action in
the event of membership changes," 0 and a broad category of "all other
decisions... [except those for which express voting provision is made]
including in particular decisions which impose on Participating Countries new obligationsnot already specified in this Agreement."""1 During its first two years of operation the Governing Board has adopted,
under the rule of unanimity, numerous "new obligations," as well as
two series of amendments to the voting arrangements required as a
consequence of the admission of new members.
By far the greatest number of matters coming before the Governing
Board is decided by majority.' 2 Most of the decisions on refinement
of the emergency system and development of the information system
were taken by majority vote, in accordance with express directions in
the Agreement.Z 3 The budget of the Agency is adopted in the Governing Board by majority, as are all other decisions regarding the
financial administration of the Agency. ' -4 Invitations to accession to
the Agreement are made by majority,"' although it should be recalled
that the consequefitial amendments to the Agreement require unanimity.' z GMajority vote is also sufficient for: decisions on the management of the Program, including decisions applying provisions of the
Agreement which already impose specific obligations on Participating
Countries, decisions on procedural questions, and recommendations." Article 62.3 provides that "Majority shall require 60 percent of
the total combined voting weights and 50 percent of the general voting
weights cast." A table of voting weights appears in Article 62.2 as
amended with effect from September 30, 1976, as follows:'-8
149.
150.
151.
152.
of the
153.
154.

Id. art. 62.6.
Id. art. 62.5.
Id. art. 61.1(b). Emphasis added.
Majority requires 60 percent of the total combined voting weights and 50 percent
general voting weights cast under art. 62.3.
See Chapters I to IV inclusive and the Annex to the I.E.P. Agreement.
I.E.P. Agreement, art. 64.3 and 64.4.
155. Id. art. 71.1.
156. Id. art. 73.
157. Id. art. 61.1(a).
158. When Norway participates in a decision taken by majority, special provisions
will apply to give effect to the participation of Norway. See supra note 63.

HASTINGS INT'L AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW

Inatigtirl

TABLE OF lEA VOTING WEIGHTS
(September 30, 1976)
Oil

Austria ....
Belgium . . .
Canada ....
. . .

Greece ....
Ireland ....
Italy .....
Japan ....

Luxembourg . .
The Netherlands.
New Zealand. .
Spain

....

Sweden ....
Switzerland . .
Turkey ....
United Kingdom
United States.
Totals..

consumption
voting
weights
(oVW)

3
3

1
2
"5

3
3
3
3
3

Denmark

Germany

Geneal
,voting
weights
(GVW)

•
••
.

.

.

33
3
3
543
3
3
3
3
3
'3

8
0
0
6
15
0
2
0
2
2
1
6
48
100

Combined
Voting
weights

(CvW)
4
5
8
4
11
3
3
9
18
3
5
3
5
4
4
9
51
154

The voting weights reflect two considerations: (1) an element of
equality, and (2) an element of oil consumption. The juridical equality
of each Participating Country as a member of the Agency is reflected
in the General voting weight (GVW) schedule, in which three weights
are allocated equally to each Participating Country, whatever its size
or the importance of its oil consumption.
Oil consumption of Participating Countries is reflected in a separate
scale of Oil consumption voting weights (OVW) on a proportionate
basis. The OVW are based upon a calculation which first considers
the consumption of oil products in 1973 (excluding bunkers) of each
Participating Country. Those figures are converted in each case to a
percentage figure which represents each country's proportion of the
oil consumption of the group as a whole. The resulting percentage
figures are then rounded to the nearest whole number and adjusted to
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100 by removal of the oil weight of the country with the percentage
figure furthest removed from the next whole number. That calculation
led to a total Oil consumption voting weight (OVWV) of 100 distributed
on a proportionate basis among Participating Countries.
Analysis of these provisions discloses that for majority vote the 60
percent of the Combined voting weights (CVW)159 rule requires ninetythree CVW. The 50 percent of GVW rule requires twenty-seven GVW
or the vote of nine Participating Countries. Under those rules no single
country has a veto on any question requiring majority vote. Nor would
any single country, even a large country like the United States, which
has fifty-one CVW, have sufficient CVW to reach the required number
of ninety-three. If the EEC, with forty-nine CVW, were to act as a
group, it would not alone have a majority. In either case, substantial
additional support would be required to achieve a majority.
In order to block a majority, a total of thirty GVW (any ten countries) or sixty-two CVW would be required. However, neither the
United States, acting alone, nor the EEC, acting as a group, could
muster the requisite number of GVW or CVW without the support of
at least one, and typically more than one, other country. To attain the
blocking level of thirty GVW the United States would need the support of nine other countries and the EEC would need two others; to
attain the blocking level of sixty-two CVW, the United States would
need the support of one to four other countries, and tie EEC would
need one to five others, depending on their CVW. On the other hand,
the United States and the EEC acting together could control any majority decision; together they could take or block any decision notwithstanding the opposition of the remaining countries of the Agency. 160
There are two provisions in the Agreement for "special majority"
voting requiring higher levels of agreement for the adoption of certain
emergency measure decisions. The first "special majority," as provided
in Article 62.4(a), as amended, requires "60 percent of the total combined voting weights and 42 general voting weights"1 16 for decisions
relating to the increase in the emergency reserve commitment, decisions not to activate the emergency measures, decisions to deactivate
159. The Combined voting weights (CVW) schedule contains the sum of the General
and Oil Consumption Voting Weights for each Participating Country.
160. There is no change in the foregoing analysis in the cases where Norway would
participate under the arrangements described supra, note 63.
161. This decision called for 36 GVW when the I.E.P. Agreement was signed. Upon
the admission of New Zealand that requirement was raised to 39 GVW, and upon the
admission of Greece, to 42.
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the emergency measures and in certain other cases. 02' - The Board has
acted in the first case shown to increase the emergency reserve commitment from sixty to seventy days, and to set the date on which that
commitment shall rise to ninety days' supply.1' 3 Since there has not
been an actual emergency during the life of the Agency, the other
provisions for the first "special majority" have not been applied.
Examination of the first "special majority" -shows that it requires
the agreement of at least fourteen countries, approximately 75 percent
of Agency countries, holding at least ninety-three CVW. The added
requirement for majority in these cases is designed to protect the Secretariat's finding under the "general trigger," which activates the emergency system on behalf of the group when it suffers an oil shortage
or emergency. As in the case of majority voting, neither the United
States nor the EEC as a group could block the emergency measures
in the face of the Secretariat's finding, unless additional countries add
their support. The EEC, acting alone, could prevent a decision which
would- block the emergency measures. The United States could do so,
as in the case of majority, with the support of one to three other Participating Countries, depending upon their number of CVW. Under the
forty-two GVW requirement, fourteen countries would be required
to block the trigger; thus any four other Participating Countries could
prevent the blocking decision from being taken.
The second "special majority," provided in Article 62.4(b), requires
forty-eight generalvoting weights for a decision to block the "selective
trigger," which activates the emergency system in response to a supply
shortfall or emergency affecting a single country, under Article 17 of
the Agreement. The decision to block the measures or to deactivate
them in such cases, requires sixteen Participating Countries; i.e., all
but two. Next to unanimity, this is the most demanding voting requirement in the Agreement.
In the case of a selective embargo, it thus becomes clear that the
embargoed country and any two other Participating Countries can
prevent the blocking decision from being taken. The Agency has not,
of course, had occasion to apply the" second "special majority," although
the voting requirement has been changed to reflect the admission of
14
new Participating Countries since the Agency was established.
162. The cases in which the first "special majority" applies are cited In art. 62.4(a).
163. This decision is described more fully, supra V.A.
164. When the Agreement was signed, the requirement was 42 GVW; that wits Increased to 45 upon the admission of New Zealand and 48 upon the admission of Greeco.
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This elaborate voting system, designed to protect the varied interests of Participating Countries in the different situations outlined
above, has quite adequately met the needs of the Agency in its
formative years. Majority voting in many instances has facilitated the
Board in reaching decisions which might not have been possible if
unanimity were required. Since these decisions are taken within a body
of the OECD, where unanimity is otherwise required, ' ' the immense
operational advantages of majority voting are apparent. While many
other organizations often apply majority voting rules, they commonly
lack the competence to make the binding decisions which the Agency's
Governing Board is einpowered to make.""0
As a consequence of the adoption of this elaborate voting system
for the Agency, normally the need does not arise to apply it explicitly.
Most of the Governing Board's decisions have been taken by consensus,
without having issues submitted to a formal vote. On several occasions
where disagreement might have occurred, the views of the Participating Countries have been expressed in the Governing Board in such a
way that the Chairman could judge that the requisite majority was
present. Rather than force a matter to formal vote, the practice of the
Board has been to adopt decisions by consensus, in reliance upon the
Chairman's perception of views within the Governing Board.'a- This
procedure enables the Board to move expeditiously in dealing with
political subjects which might otherwise prove difficult to manage in
a multilateral institution.

VII. CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing analysis of the origins, structure, and early operations
of the International Energy Agency demonstrates that the oil consumer
countries have responded in a constructive, institutional fashion to the
energy challenges of our day. They met those challenges by creating
institutions based upon the traditions of international lav and organizations. They entered into an international treaty which brought their
common interests into focus. The new institutions were designed to
give permanence and flexibility to this program. In establishing the
Agency, the consumer countries built upon existing models, re-shaped
165. OECD voting rules are discussed supra at I.B.
166. See H. SCHmmns, supra note 144.
167. For practice of other organizations, see 2 Sc~rtmns supra note 144, 327; R.
HIscocs, ThE SEcurry CouxciL 104 (1973).
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them to meet the new challenges and adopted institutional innovations
in respect to such matters as:
1. The integration of an autonomous Agency into an existing international organization, the OECD;
2. The adoption of binding rules under the international law of
treaties to cover the key elements of the Program;
3. The establishment of new forms of cooperation for the long-term
solution to the problem of providing alternative energy sources;
4. The adoption of a workable decision-making system with voting
rules dominated, not by traditional notions of sovereign equality,
but designed to reflect the realities of decision-making in modern
international organizations;
5. "The conferring of extraordinary and unprecedented powers upon
an international Secretariat, as an impartial body, to act without the
political pressures which might prevent governments from acting
in an emergency situation.
The establishment ojf the Agency under these circumstances also
d'emonstrates that with the necessary political will to overcome organizational inertia, a group of like-minded governments is capable of
responding to a potentially catastrophic international economic situation by identifying -their mutual interests, establishing their cohesion,
and seizing upon. an opportunity to build a stable institutional mechanism for.the'achievement of their common objectives.
This successful initiative of the consumer countries was made possible by an essentially optimistic judgment that constructive cooperation in a coherent international institutional setting still provides a
preferable means for solving problems, particularly in view of the
alternatives that might- have to be faced.'( 8
The establishment of the Agency also reflects the equally optimistic
judgment that international institutions are fully worthy of trust for
carrying out the most difficult and sensitive political and economic
tasks. The operations of the Agency, as it carries out its functions, may
hopefully contribute to that sense of trust in order that statesmen may
continue in the future to confer their most troublesome problems to
international institutions for cooperative peaceful resolution.
168. This essentially optimistic judgment was repeatedly emphasized by Secretary
Kissinger in his statements on the International Energy Agency during the formativo
period. See, for example, his University of Chicago Board of Trustees speech of November 14, 1974, The Energy Crisis: Strategy for Co-operative Action, 71 DrPT. or STATX
BULL. 749, 756 (1974).

